The Economics of Climate Policy by Toman, Michael & Kolstad, Charles
 
The Economics of Climate Policy 
Charles D. Kolstad and Michael Toman 




Resources for the Future 
1616 P Street, NW 





© 2000 Resources for the Future. All rights reserved. No 
portion of this paper may be reproduced without permission of 
the authors. 
Discussion papers are research materials circulated by their 
authors for purposes of information and discussion. They have 
not necessarily undergone formal peer review or editorial 
treatment. ii 
The Economics of Climate Policy 
Charles D. Kolstad and Michael Toman 
Abstract 
Economics has played an increasingly important role in shaping policy, in the United States and 
elsewhere. This paper reviews some of the dimensions of the economic approach to analyzing, 
understanding, and developing solutions to the problem of climate change. We then turn to the issue of 
designing regulatory instruments to control the problem. The paper concludes with a discussion of the 
political economy of greenhouse gas control in an international context. 
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The Economics of Climate Policy 
Charles D. Kolstad and Michael Toman∗  
I.Introduction 
One of the biggest environmental issues of the past decade is global warming or, more 
generally, climate change brought about by human activities, including emissions of various 
“greenhouse gases” (GHGs). Economics has played a visible role in climate policy debates in the 
United States and elsewhere, a more prominent role than it has played in some other 
environmental problems. 
This paper serves as a review of some of the dimensions of the economic approach to 
analyzing, understanding, and developing solutions to the problem of climate change.1 Much has 
been written on this subject; consequently, this review can only highlight some of the important 
results in the literature. 
In the next section, we discuss the climate change problem generally, particularly the 
physical and technological dimensions of the problem and its solutions. In section III we review 
estimates of the costs and benefits of controlling the emissions of pollution leading to climate 
change. We then turn to the fundamental economics of the problem in Section IV, laying out a 
simple analytic model that captures the economic approach to the problem. In section V we 
address the design of climate policy instruments, after which we turn to the problem of forging 
viable international climate agreements in section VI. 
II.Overview of the Climate Change Issue 
In this section we first provide a brief introduction to the science of climate change, 
addressing both changes in the earth’s atmosphere and climate system and the potential 
consequences of those changes. We then review the different options available for responding to 
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the risks posed by climate change. We conclude this section with a brief history of international 
activities to mitigate the threats. 
A. Nature of the Challenge 
The composition of the earth’s atmosphere—in particular, the natural presence of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) and water vapor—causes it to trap heat like a greenhouse. The composition of the 
atmosphere ensures that the earth is warmer than Mars, but not like Venus. 
Human activities add to the concentration of heat-trapping gases in the atmosphere. CO2 
released from use of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) is the most plentiful human-created 
GHG. Other GHGs—including methane (CH4),2 the now-banned chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) 
and their substitutes currently in use, and nitrous oxides associated with fertilizer use—are 
emitted in lower volumes than CO2 but trap more heat per unit of the gas.  Other pollutants can 
enhance or blunt the greenhouse effect.  For example, sulfur dioxide emissions lead to sulfate 
aerosols that cause cooling; ground-level ozone can enhance warming. 
Scientists worry that the accumulation of these gases in the atmosphere has and will 
continue to change the climate.3 Climate change is a historical fact, as illustrated by the many ice 
ages. Part of the controversy today is the extent to which human activities are responsible for 
changes in the climate system. While acknowledging the many uncertainties about the precise 
nature and strength of the link between human activities and climate change, most climate 
scientists argue that the evidence points to an effect from people emitting into the atmosphere too 
much CO2 and other GHGs.4 
They reach this conclusion in part by observing two trends. Global-surface temperature 
data show that the Earth has warmed 0.6ºC (or 1ºF) over the past 100 years. At the same time, 
                                                 
2 Human-induced methane releases come from natural gas supply leaks, some coal mines, decomposition in 
landfills, and agricultural sources such as rice paddies and domestic animals. 
3 Climate change is not the same as the day-to-day or even year-to-year fluctuations of the weather. However, the 
nature of these fluctuations is one of the things that could be altered by climate change.  
4 The first volume of the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 
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Meteorological Organization to assess the state of existing knowledge about climate change and its impacts.) Since 
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atmospheric concentrations of GHGs like CO2 have increased by about 30% over the past 200 
years, basically since the beginning of the industrial revolution. Scientists attempt to capture the 
interactions of a complex dynamic climate system and the human activities that put additional 
GHGs in the atmosphere by developing complicated computer models. These models simulate 
how future climate conditions might change with, for example, a doubling of the preindustrial 
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere. 
Some scientists stress that one should not confuse correlation with causation. These 
scientists also question the current ability to separate human-induced changes from natural 
variability. While the causation between human actions and higher temperatures continues to be 
debated, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded in its Second 
Assessment Report that “…the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human 
influence on global climate.”5 The recently released summary of the IPCC Third Assessment 
Report concludes that "there is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed 
over the last fifty years is attributable to human activities" (IPCC, 2001; p 10).  A recent report 
by the U.S. National Research Council (2000) states that evidence for a human contribution is 
rising. At the same time, however, the report showed a wide range of possible quantitative 
forecasts of climate change.6   
Greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere for decades to hundreds of years, depending 
on the gas. Concentrations of GHGs depend on the long-term profile of emissions; changes in 
emissions in any one year have a trivial effect on overall concentration levels. Even significant 
reductions in emissions made today would not substantially affect concentrations for decades or 
longer. In addition, the major emitters of GHGs will change over time. Today the industrialized 
world accounts for the largest portion of emissions. By the middle of this century, however, 
developing countries with growing population and wealth are likely to generate the largest share 
of emissions, given their rising populations and economic activities. Both of these factors affect 
how one designs climate policies, as we discuss below. 
                                                 
5 The phrase “balance of the evidence” is taken from the policymakers’ summary of the IPCC (1996a) report and 
has generated some controversy in its own right. Chapter 8 of the report characterizes the many uncertainties. 
6 Particularly vexing is the limited ability of physical models to capture (i) climate change on any scale less than 
continental, making it difficult to assess regional changes; (ii) how conventional pollutants such as very fine 
“aerosol” particles are offset by the effect of GHGs by reflecting back sunlight; and (iii) how human activity on land 
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B. The Potential Physical and Socioeconomic Consequences of Climate Change  
The risk of climate change depends not just on what happens to the climate system but 
also on the physical and socioeconomic implications of a changing climate. Climate change 
might have a variety of effects. Examples include: 
•  Reduced productivity of resources that humans use or extract from the natural 
environment, such as lower agricultural yields and timber harvests and scarcer water 
resources. 
•  Damage to human-built environments, such as coastal flooding from sea-level rise, 
incursion of salt water into drinking water systems, and damages from increased 
storms and floods. 
•  Risks to life and limb, such as more deaths from heat waves and increased incidence 
of tropical diseases as these diseases migrate to formerly more temperate climates. 
•  Damage to “less managed resources”, such as wilderness areas, natural habitats for 
scarce species, or biodiversity. Sea-level rise, for example, would inundate coastal 
wetlands, whereas increased inland aridity could destroy prairie wetlands.  
All of these damages are posited to result from long-term changes in the concentrations 
of GHGs in the atmosphere, as well as very rapid rates of climate change. Most of the adverse 
effects of climate change most likely will take decades or longer to materialize. Moreover, the 
odds that these events will come to pass are uncertain and not well understood. Numerical 
estimates of physical impacts remain scanty, and confidence intervals are even harder to 
delineate. Sea-level rise from polar ice melting, for instance, is perhaps the best understood, and 
the current predicted range of change is still broad.7 The risks of catastrophic effects such as 
shifts in the Gulf Stream or the sudden collapse of polar ice caps are even harder to gauge.  
Unknown physical risks are compounded by uncertain socioeconomic consequences. 
Estimates of potential impacts on market goods and services such as agricultural output can be 
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made to some degree, at least in developed countries. But monetary estimates for nonmarket 
goods such as human and ecosystem health give rise to serious debate.8 
Much of the climate change debate focuses on the long-term implications of a changed 
climate. Less of the debate considers the pace of climate change.9 To illustrate the point, suppose 
human systems are exceedingly resilient and, given enough time, can completely adapt to any 
change in the climate. The changes that are necessary to adapt as the climate changes may 
nonetheless be very costly. If Manhattan Island is flooded, eventually New York City will 
relocate further inland, and, if we revisit it in a millennium or two, it is possible that the citizens 
of New York will have completely adapted. Yet clearly the consequences of rapidly flooding 
Manhattan Island are enormous. 
Moreover, existing estimates of risk apply almost exclusively to industrial countries like 
the United States. Less is known about the adverse socioeconomic consequences for poorer 
societies, even though these societies arguably are more vulnerable to climate change. Economic 
growth will presumably lessen some of the vulnerability to climate change, for example, threats 
to agricultural yields or basic sanitation services. However, economic growth in the long term 
would be imperiled in those areas (like tropical and coastal regions) dependent on natural and 
ecological resources adversely affected by climate change. Aggregate statistics mask 
considerable regional variation, with some areas likely to benefit from climate change while 
others lose.10 In weighing the consequences of climate change, moreover, it is also important to 
keep in mind that humans adapt to risks that they perceive so as to lower their losses. We return 
to this point below. 
Policymakers must address hazy estimates of risks, benefits from taking action, and the 
potential for adaptation against the uncertain but also consequential cost of reducing GHGs when 
constructing a viable and effective risk-reducing climate policy. Costs of mitigation matter, as do 
costs of climate change itself. One must consider the consequences of committing resources to 
reducing risk of climate change, resources that could otherwise be used to meet other human 
interests, just as one must weigh the consequences of different climatic changes. 
                                                 
8 See Moore (1998), Tol (1995), Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), Faskhauser (1995), and Mendelsohn and Neumann 
(1999). 
9 See Fankhauser and Tol (1996) and Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti (2001). 
10 IPCC (1998) provides a review of the current state of knowledge on regional impacts.  See also Norhaus and 
Boyer (2000), Nordhaus and Yang (1996) and Tol (1995). Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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C.  Mitigation and Adaptation 
There are of course many things that can be done to “manage” the climate change 
problem. Some of these actions are best done by governments, such as mandating emission 
reductions or investing in more resilient infrastructure. Other actions are best done by private 
agents acting on their own, such as adapting production practices to a different climate. In fact, 
there is great richness in the types of things that can be done to reduce the deleterious effects of 
climate change. In this section, we consider four categories of actions: emissions control, carbon 
sequestration, geoengineering, and adaptation.11  
As we saw above, climate change can involve a myriad of effects, ranging from changed 
mean temperatures and precipitation, changed variance of the weather (more or less frequent 
storms), and sea-level change, to more subtle effects such as incursions of pests and disease, 
particularly insect pests whose territory changes (for example, the Anopheles mosquito, carrying 
malaria). How climate change is manifested is obviously important to how we characterize such 
aspects as adaptation and mitigation. 
1. Emissions Control 
The most obvious way of managing climate change is to reduce emissions of GHGs into 
the atmosphere, particularly CO2 from fossil fuel combustion. Technologically, this objective 
involves either reducing use of carbon-rich fuels or using technology to reduce emissions of 
GHGs from what otherwise would be the case, in much the same way that precipitators remove 
particulates from smoke streams.  Removal of GHGs from emissions streams is technically 
feasible, and there is increasing interest in this technological option for managing climate change 
in the longer term (Kim and Edmonds 2000, McFarland et al. 2001).  These options are still quite 
expensive (in terms of overall cost, including reduced energy output) compared with other 
options; there are questions about the long-term permanence of some CO2 storage approaches; 
and the technologies in question are most readily applicable to large stationary emission sources, 
                                                 
11 There are other ways of categorizing steps to manage climate change. NAS (1992) divides actions temporally into 
mitigation, which seeks to arrest the problem before it occurs, and adaptation, which seeks to reduce the negative 
impacts of climate change. The IPCC (1996b) does not distinguish between adaptation and adjustment, instead 
defining adaptability as the extent to which adjustments are possible. Of course it is the concepts that are important, 
not the semantics. Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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which represent only a fraction of total greenhouse gas emissions.  Nevertheless, these 
technologies are moving from the realm of fantasy to the realm of the technologically possible 
and the economically imaginable.   
Widespread availability of environmentally sound and economically affordable 
engineered sequestration would fundamentally change the nature of the climate policy debate by 
relaxing the current tight link between carbon policy and reduced use of fossil fuels.  It would 
also fundamentally alter the economic analysis of climate policy by creating a new kind of 
“backstop technology.”  Instead of considering only non-fossil energy technologies that become 
economic over the long term after a high shadow price is put on GHG emissions, it might be 
possible for fossil fuels to continue being utilized extensively with a more modest shadow price 
that induces end-of pipe treatment.12  Nevertheless, over the short-to-medium term this approach 
is not likely to be that significant compared to reducing the use of carbon-rich fuels.  And there is 
no assurance these technologies will developed as hoped in terms of cost or environmental 
reliability.  
Emissions control generally must be mandated by the government, which is not the case 
for some of the other risk mitigation and adaptation strategies. Governments must provide 
requirements and/or incentives for individuals, firms, and public agencies to reduce GHG 
emissions and perhaps pursue strategies to reduce the cost of controlling GHG emissions. Later 
in this paper we will address the menu of policies that are available to accomplish this goal. 
2. Sequestration 
Although restricting the emissions of GHGs into the atmosphere is an important goal, the 
atmosphere already has significant quantities of GHGs, particularly CO2. Another strategy for 
managing the GHG problem is to store CO2 (or simply carbon) that is currently in the 
atmosphere somewhere besides the atmosphere. This practice is sequestration.13  
                                                 
12 Kim and Edmonds (2000) cite figures based on technology research byu the US Energy Department indicating 
that while current costs are well over $100 per ton of carbon captured, and may run over $300 per ton for some 
technologies, there is an aspiration to bring these costs down to around $10 per ton in a relatively short time (the 
next 25 years).  This would reduce the shadow prices necessary to stabilize atmospheric CO2 concentrations by over 
70 percent relative to scenarios without such technoligies. 
13 In some uses, “sequestration” is interpreted to include extraction and storage of GHGs from waste gas streams 
(which we mentioned above under emissions control) as well as biological storage, which is our focus here. Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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The most common and obvious form of sequestration is carbon stored in plants, 
particularly trees (Sedjo et al. 1997; Stavins 1999; Sedjo and Sohngen 2000; Newell and Stavins, 
2000). There are problems with sequestration in trees. Forests around the world are being 
cleared, effectively releasing previously stored carbon into the atmosphere.14 Land is becoming 
scarcer due to population pressures, and sequestration in trees requires land. Another problem is 
that sequestration of new carbon slows significantly when a tree reaches maturity. Thus there is a 
limit to how much carbon can be sequestered simply by planting trees. Some researchers have 
addressed this question by proposing the “pickling” of cut trees, possibly storing them in the cold 
deep ocean (Nordhaus, 1991). Another problem with sequestration is that it can easily be 
reversed and that is not always easy to detect. A forest that has been used to store carbon can be 
logged rapidly, or burn, reversing the sequestration. For this reason, some advocates of GHG 
reduction are nervous about relying on sequestration as a control measure. 
There are other places to sequester carbon besides trees. Different agricultural practices 
can increase the storage of carbon in the soil through the plant roots. Like mitigation, 
sequestration involves the active involvement of government. Sequestration beyond “business as 
usual” trends will not be pursued without government incentives or direction. 
3. Geoengineering 
Geoengineering is the province of “big thinkers.” Rather than controlling the 
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere, geoengineering would undertake large-scale 
engineering of our environment to reduce the impacts of climate change directly. The menu of 
possibilities is lengthy.15 
Several geoengineering approaches have been proposed to reduce the level of climate 
change, in particular by increasing the reflectivity (albedo) of the earth. As described in NAS 
(1992), there are many schemes for achieving this objective, including adding dust to the 
stratosphere, adding mirrors to space just outside the atmosphere, floating large balloons high in 
the atmosphere, and painting the roofs of houses white.  
                                                 
14 When a tree is cut, the carbon in the tree is not of course immediately released to the atmosphere. This release 
requires either combustion of the wood or decomposition. 
15 See Marland (1996), Schneider (1996) and Schelling (1996). Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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A good deal of CO2 (and other gases) is dissolved in the ocean. Small ocean creatures 
(phytoplankton) incorporate carbon into their skeletons and shells, which are subsequently 
deposited on the ocean floor. In principle this potential could be exploited by encouraging the 
growth of these ocean microorganisms by “fertilizing” the ocean with other necessary nutrients 
like trace quantities of iron, which stimulates photosynthesis and thus phytoplankton growth 
(NAS 1992). However, the consequences of this approach for marine ecology are unclear. 
Few of these ideas appear feasible at present, though they do remain options. Even more 
than mitigation and sequestration, geoengineering would require major public policy efforts. 
4. Adaptation 
The three approaches that have just been discussed, emission control, sequestration, and 
geoengineering, have focused on the public-good nature of the global climate and thus of 
necessity have they been activities initiated by governments as public-goods providers. We now 
turn to actions that individual agents as well as governments take to reduce the impact of climate 
change. 
Farmers clearly can and will change their practices when they observe or anticipate the 
climate changing. Agriculture thrives in many climates around the world and does not need 
climate homogeneity. Thus, one could consider a climate change in one location as equivalent to 
the climate there becoming like another spot on earth, whose agricultural practices ultimately 
will be adopted. This observation is the essence of the Mendelsohn et al. (1994) analysis of the 
long-term effects of differing climates in the United States on agricultural productivity (via land 
value).16  
The subject of farmer adaptation has been researched and discussed at length (see 
Schimmelpfennig et al. 1996; Rosenberg 1993). Although no consensus exists, the basic 
conclusion emerging from this literature is that, at a global level and in many regions, agriculture 
is highly adaptable when growers have the capacity to anticipate and react to prospective 
changes. This conclusion is underscored by the likelihood of further research to expand 
adaptation opportunities (for example, more drought-resistant crop types). According to this 
view, climate change will not pose a significant threat to global food supply. It may pose local 
                                                 
16 There is controversy over this approach to inferring adaptation possibilities by comparing locations with different 
long-run equilibrium climates.  See Schneider et al. 2000. Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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threats, however, especially in the period of transition to an altered climate regime. This threat 
could be troublesome in some areas, especially in developing countries, where adaptation 
capacity is more limited and agriculture (both market and subsistence) is a large share of total 
economic activity.17 
The adaptation of forest systems to climate change has also received extensive study (see, 
for example, Sohngen and Mendelsohn 1999). The general message in the economic assessments 
is that, overall, the impacts on global timber markets over the long term are likely to be modest 
(taking account of salvage harvesting in the event of die-backs, regeneration of different natural 
forests, and adaptation through advanced plantation cultivation techniques). As well, the 
transition costs may be more serious in some areas, and the impacts on nonmarket forest 
resources—in particular, biodiversity—may be more problematic.  
Changing precipitation patterns will create local stresses on water resources.  These likely 
can be adapted to at some cost. The effects will depend on the severity of the local impacts, 
which remain uncertain, and the degree of adaptation capacity, which could be problematic in 
some places (again, especially in developing countries; Frederick et al. 1997, Frederick and 
Gleick, 1999).  Adaptation will be blunted by such institutional failures as missing water markets 
and price subsidies that conceal the true scarcity of water resources.  
Less well-known is how easily other sectors of the economy can adapt to climate change. 
Nordhaus (1994) has suggested that most nonagricultural sectors of developed economies are not 
particularly dependent on the climate or weather. Mendelsohn’s (1999) general survey of climate 
change vulnerability comes to a similar conclusion. However, this characterization focuses 
mainly on the consequences of a long-term rise in mean temperature and associated effects. 
Certainly an increased frequency of devastating weather (for example, hurricanes) can have 
widespread effect, even to a sector not typically dependent on climate. For instance, the electric 
power sector can deal very well with changes in mean weather; but storms bring havoc, 
particularly to distribution and transmission systems. 
Natural ecosystems also are affected by climate change and to the extent that humans are 
affected, tangibly or intangibly, by these ecosystems, we need to be concerned with their ability 
to adapt. This capacity—for example, in wetlands or wilderness areas—remains quite uncertain. 
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Also uncertain are the impacts of climate change on human health (more extreme weather, more 
tropical diseases) vis-à-vis the capacity to adapt to these impacts. 18 
The costs of adjusting from one climate to another could be significant and they depend 
particularly on the speed at which the climate changes, as well as on the resilience of the natural 
systems being affected. We would expect to observe two main types of adjustment as the climate 
changes. One has to do with agents learning how to deal with a new environment. This 
adjustment may be easy or difficult, especially if information about adaptation challenges and 
opportunities is limited. It will be compounded by uncertainty about whether the climate has 
changed, an issue we return to in a later section. Another effect is associated with adjusting the 
stock of capital, such as buildings and machinery. Clearly, if the sea around Manhattan rises 1 
mm a year, it will be easier to adjust than if the rate of increase is 100 mm a year. In the former 
case, capital can be allowed to depreciate; whereas in the later case, perfectly good capital will 
need to be abandoned.  
In general, the ability to adapt contributes more to lowering the net risk of climate change 
in situations where human control over relevant natural systems and infrastructure is greater. We 
have more capacity to adapt in agricultural activities than in wilderness preservation, for 
example. The potential to adapt also depends on a society’s wealth and on the presence of 
various kinds of social infrastructure such as educational and public health systems; for example, 
richer countries are likely to face less of a threat to human health from climate change than 
poorer societies with less infrastructure. 
D.  International Policy Toward Climate Change 
Table I summarizes some milestones in the evolution of global climate policy. The 
negotiation of the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change was a watershed in that  
Table I. Summary of Key Milestones in Climate Policy 
1979  First World Climate Conference held in Geneva 
1990  First Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); initial 
evidence that human activities might be affecting climate, but there is significant uncertainty 
                                                 
18 For further general discussion of adaptation possibilities see Smith et al. 1996, Pielke 1998, Kane and Shogren 
2000, and Schneider et al. 2000. Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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1990  Second World Climate Conference held in Geneva; agreement to negotiate a “framework treaty” 
1992  U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) established at the U.N. Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED, the “Earth Summit”), Rio de Janeiro; “Annex I” 
developed countries pledge to return emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 
1995  IPCC Second Assessment Report completed (published in 1996); stronger conviction expressed 
that human activities could be adversely affecting climate 
1995  “Berlin Mandate” developed at the first Conference of Parties (COP1) to the UNFCCC 
agreement to negotiate legally binding targets and timetables to limit emissions in Annex I 
countries  
1997  COP3, held in Kyoto Japan, led to the “Kyoto Protocol,” Annex I/Annex B countries agree to 
binding emission reductions averaging 5% below 1990 levels by 2008–2012, with “flexibility 
mechanisms” (including emissions trading) for compliance; no commitments for emission 
limitation by developing countries 
1997  U.S. Senate passes Byrd–Hagel resolution 95–0, stating that the United States should accept no 
climate agreement that did not demand comparable sacrifices of all participants, and calling for 
administration to justify any proposed ratification of the Kyoto Protocol with analysis of benefits 
and costs 
1998  COP4, held in Buenos Aires Argentina, emphasizes operationalizing the “flexibility 
mechanisms” of the Kyoto Protocol; IPCC Third Assessment begins 
1999  COP5, held in Bonn Germany, continued emphasis on operationalizing the flexibility 
mechanisms  
2000  COP6 held in the Hague; deadlock on implementing key provisions of the Kyoto Protocol 
2001  US President George Bush states opposition to the Kyoto Protocol 
Sources: U.N. Environment Programme (www.unep.ch/iucc/fact17.html); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (www.ipcc.ch/activity/act.htm); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat 
(www.unfccc.de/text/resource/index.html). 
process.19 Article 2 of the Convention states that the objective is to stabilize concentrations 
within a time frame that would prevent “dangerous” human damage to the climate system. 
Article 3 states that precautionary risk reduction should be guided by equity across time and 
wealth levels, as expressed in the concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities.” 
Article 4 states that nations should cooperate to improve human adaptation and mitigation of 
climate change through financial support and low-emission technologies. Articles 3 and 4 also 
refer to the use of cost-effective response measures. 
                                                 
19 For a text of the Convention and subsequent documents (including the Kyoto Protocol discussed below), see 
www.unfccc.de. Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention is the next major milestone. The 
Protocol states that the industrialized “Annex B” countries (known in the Convention as “Annex 
I” countries) agreed to legally binding emissions reductions by the 2008–2012 period, resulting 
in emissions averaging 5% below 1990 levels.20 Given expected business-as-usual emissions 
growth in the United States between 1990 and 2010, the actual emissions reductions needed for 
compliance are substantial (on the order of one-third of what otherwise would prevail in the 
United States). No numerical targets for emissions of developing countries were set in the 
protocol. In other words, the approach taken was “deep, then broad”; a few countries are to make 
significant cuts early with the hope of broader participation later, rather than the “broad, then 
deep” strategy promoted by many critics of Kyoto.21  
The Kyoto Protocol includes several “flexibility” mechanisms that allow nations some 
latitude as to how they will meet the targets and timetables. The exact details of how these 
mechanisms would operate were left largely for future negotiations. Individual Annex B 
countries are free to achieve their targets through any credible domestic policies they wish to 
use; domestic policies need not be coordinated. The Protocol also provides for international 
“where flexibility” in which nations can reduce emissions through different forms of 
international trading of emissions quotas. We discuss these options in more detail in Section V. 
The Protocol further provides flexibility in that emissions targets can be met by reducing any of 
six different gases, not just CO2, as well as through carbon sequestration through “sinks” such as 
forests. Non-CO2 gases are compared with CO2 by means of “global warming potential” 
equivalency factors that reflect the heat-trapping properties of different gases in the 
atmosphere.22 
                                                 
20 Annex I nations were listed in an appendix (Annex I) to the Framework Convention. In the Kyoto Protocol, the 
list of nations is in Annex B. The targets agreed to in Kyoto varied across countries, with the United States agreeing 
to a 7% reduction while Western Europe undertook an overall cut of 8% (divided unequally among European Union 
members in subsequent negotiations) and Japan accepted a less steep reduction of 6%. Special provisions were made 
in defining the obligations of the industrialized countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, whose emissions already are below 1990 levels. The agreement is further complicated by the fact that 
reductions in a number of other GHGs, not just CO2, “count”. There is also a role for carbon sequestration in 
biomass (that is, increased forest cover), but this role has not been made clear yet. 
21 For a critique of the Kyoto Protocol’s “deep then broad” character see Jacoby et al. (1998) and Shogren (1999). 
We return to this issue in Section VI below. 
22 However, variations in long-term heat-trapping capacity do not immediate translate into variations in potential 
damage. For example, methane has high heat-trapping potential but a short residence time in the atmosphere 
compared with CO2. If damages from climate change are growing over time because of GHG accumulation 
generally, near-term CH4 releases will be less consequential than near-term CO2 releases, whereas the opposite is 
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Post-Kyoto meetings continued the international debate, especially about the technical, 
legal, and moral foundations of the proposed flexibility mechanisms. This debate revealed sharp 
differences in opinion between the United States (with some other energy-intensive 
industrialized countries) and the European Union, as well as many developing countries. At issue 
was the extent to which reliance on international emissions trading could substitute for, or could 
only complement, domestic efforts to reduce energy use and CO2 emissions. The ultimate fate of 
the flexibility mechanisms—and of the Protocol itself—remains to be seen.  
III.Benefits and Costs of Greenhouse Gas Control 
A fundamental building block of a viable climate control policy is a quantitative 
understanding of the consequences of climate change and emission control. We turn to these 
issues in this section. 
The loss of welfare from a change in the climate can be dealt with in terms of the benefits 
of GHG control or in terms of the damages from a lack of control and a continuation of emission 
growth leading to climate change. We refer to benefits rather than damages though the concepts 
are the same. The costs of GHG control are somewhat more straightforward but still fairly 
uncertain. Though some say GHG emissions can be reduced substantially, at no cost, simply by 
eliminating inefficiencies, most analysts recognize that there are costs associated with 
significantly reducing the emission level. 
In this section we examine three questions at a fairly superficial level. The first issue 
concerns the costs of GHG control. The second issue covers the benefits of GHG control. The 
third section includes estimates of the net benefits of pursuing control that balances costs and 
benefits. 
A. Costs of Greenhouse Gas Control  
                                                                                                                                                             
true if emissions are occurring near the time of peak climate change and impacts (Reilly and Richards 1993, 
Schmalensee 1993, Hammitt et al. 1996, Smith and Wigley 2000a, 2000b). Ideally, for policy purposes different 
GHGs should be traded off against each other based on their relative contribution to socioeconomic impacts, not just 
their chemical properties; but there is no agreement on what damage-based equivalence factors should be. 
Uncertainty about the way to discount the streams of long-term socioeconomic impacts is a significant element of 
this problem.  Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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We first turn to the question of what economic costs might be associated with a reduction 
of GHG emissions. Though one might ultimately like to aggregate such costs into a marginal 
cost schedule, indicating the overall incremental cost from specific levels of reduction, it is 
appropriate to understand the nature of these costs and the difficulty in measuring them.  
Imagine a country levying an emission fee of $10 per ton of carbon. How might that 
country’s economy respond to such a fee? If we conduct this thought experiment for a range of 
such fees, we trace out a marginal control cost schedule.  
A range of effects result from ratcheting up the price of carbon, some short-run, some 
long-run. In the short run, consumers of fossil fuels will reduce use because of the increase in 
cost of fossil fuel caused by the charge for carbon emissions. Reducing use is not a costless 
process. Drivers that forego travel have lost utility as a result of the increase in the effective cost 
of driving. Products that involve GHG emissions as part of the production process will become 
dearer, and thus sales will be marginally lower. For instance, fertilizer may become more 
expensive because of the inputs of fossil fuels in its manufacture. This price increase will result 
in less fertilizer use. In both the case of the driver reducing auto use and the farmer reducing 
fertilizer use, additional resources are expended in attempting to overcome the increased price of 
carbon emissions. Drivers lose utility from driving less but may also buy more expensive fuel-
efficient cars; farmers may adopt more expensive farming practices to make up for the loss in use 
of fertilizer. There are direct effects of raising the price of carbon and there are indirect, 
ultimately general equilibrium, effects of raising the price of carbon. 
1. A Cost Taxonomy 
Hourcade et al. (1996a) distinguish four types of costs associated with reducing 
emissions of GHGs: direct outlays for control, partial equilibrium costs to consumers and 
producers, general equilibrium costs, and nonmarket costs.23  
Direct outlays for control are the most intuitive and obvious costs of control: scrubbers to 
remove CO2, the extra costs of using natural gas instead of coal, the costs of additional insulation 
in homes. People often focus on these costs in arguing for “negative-cost opportunities” (actions 
that can be taken that save money). For instance, additional insulation in homes is often cost-
                                                 
23 Jaffe et al. 1995 provide a more detailed taxonomy that includes government administration costs, transaction 
costs, and other elements. Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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effective over the lifetime of the home. Yet, due to myopia, imperfect capital markets, and 
imperfect information on the part of home buyers, such negative-cost actions are often not taken. 
The next level of costs includes these direct outlays but also includes more subtle costs 
that result in a reduction in producer and consumer surplus. Examples for a producer would be 
accelerated depreciation of fixed capital when relative prices change (older fuel-inefficient cars 
drop in value when the price of energy increases) and adjustment costs associated with changing 
production processes. For consumers, having to forego activities that have become more costly 
results in lost utility, lost surplus. The sense in which these factors are considered partial 
equilibrium effects is that the consequences of an elevation in the price of GHG emissions are 
not being traced through the entire economy. The price of gasoline goes up and consumers and 
producers of gasoline adjust, keeping other prices constant. 
The third level of costs encompasses all economic costs of GHG control, taking into 
account the many indirect and feedback effects that take place within a modern economy. For 
instance, when the price of carbon increases, the price of oil (net of tax) would be expected to 
decrease. This scenario would depress the oil industry and thus have consequences for firms 
providing inputs to the oil industry, to local industry dependent on worker income from the oil 
industry, and to local universities dependent on oil revenues for finance. These latter sectoral 
effects are what would be considered secondary effects, not normally picked up in a partial 
equilibrium analysis. These effects may be minor, as would be expected for small changes in a 
part of the economy. It is also important to separate short-term adjustment costs (including 
temporary unemployment) from long-term equilibrium adjustments. 
Somewhat ambiguous are the costs generated by preexisting distortions such as labor 
taxes in the economy. When carbon taxes or other carbon policies exacerbate the inefficiencies 
of labor taxes, should those additional costs be laid at the feet of the carbon tax? If there were no 
labor tax, there would be no extra inefficiency from the carbon tax. As Coase might suggest, 
either the carbon tax or the labor tax could be blamed for the extra inefficiency. But which to 
blame is not the point; the fact is that there will be an additional cost to society that results from 
an increase in the carbon tax (see Goulder 1995). Moreover, these costs can be ameliorated in 
part through judicious recycling of tax revenues, in contrast to revenue-neutral policies (Parry et 
al. 1999). 
Economists note that not all dimensions of human welfare are reflected in the value of 
market goods and services and the utility that accrues from consuming these goods and services. 
Certainly there are many aspects of the benefits of GHG control that are outside the market; for Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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example, enhanced ecosystem well-being. Thus it is easy to argue that there may be some costs 
of GHG control that will not be reflected in the marketplace. For example, long-term 
unemployment could result from policies that rein in GHG emissions, and the human toll of 
unemployment includes nonmonetary factors.  
2. Bottom-up vs. Top-Down 
No review of the costs of GHG control would be complete without some attention to the 
debate that has been dubbed “bottom-up vs. top-down,” based on the general way in which costs 
are computed. In computing control costs, the bottom-up moniker derives from the use of 
detailed models of the cost of GHG control. These detailed models attempt to enumerate many of 
the abatement options available to specific consumers, producers, or sectors. Attaching costs to 
each of these options, it is possible to determine least-cost ways to reduce GHGs. For instance, a 
model could include a housing sector within which the options for reducing the heating needs for 
a typical house are enumerated (for example, insulation, smart thermostats, roof color). These 
models can be thought of as engineering-oriented because the choice of technology is purely 
cost-based without much behavioral content. Because of the assembling of aggregate cost 
measures from very micro-level data, this approach has been named bottom-up.  
The top-down approach derives from observing behavior as relative prices change. We 
have some experience with how consumers and producers respond when energy prices change, 
based on three decades or more of a roller coaster of crude oil prices. Top-down estimates of the 
cost of control are not concerned with exactly what, technologically, a consumer or producer 
does when the price of energy changes, but rather what the overall result is in terms of energy 
consumption. 
One would think that the top-down and bottom-up approaches to estimating the aggregate 
cost of GHG control would yield approximately the same marginal cost curve. After all, both 
approaches involve behavior of the same agents in the economy and seek to measure the same 
factor, the cost of controlling GHGs. Yet, the top-down estimates of control costs are typically 
higher than the bottom-up approaches. The reasons for this discrepancy are not altogether clear. 
One explanation, however, is that the bottom-up modelers are inevitably optimistic. They 
identify technologically feasible cost-effective approaches for reducing GHGs. Technological 
feasibility is clearly a necessary condition for undertaking GHG control. However, many other 
factors besides technological feasibility ultimately enter into the decision as to how to control 
GHGs, factors that can only increase costs above the least-cost technologically feasible strategy 
(Jaffe et al, 1999).  Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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A somewhat extreme example illustrates this point. Suppose we examine household use 
of the family car for local travel around the neighborhood. The question is, if the price of 
gasoline goes up, how much use can be curtailed? A bottom-up analysis might suggest that use 
could be curtailed dramatically. The household members could carefully assemble a shopping 
list and go to the grocery store only once a week or even less frequently. Trips to work could be 
consolidated with neighbors. Miscellaneous errands could be aggregated into the weekly 
shopping trip. The opportunities for reducing use seem tremendous. A bottom-up analysis might 
show that a small increase in the price of gasoline would result in dramatic reduction in gasoline 
consumption. Or perhaps the analysis would demonstrate the opportunities to reduce gasoline 
consumption that have no cost at all; the trip consolidation described above is a good idea no 
matter what the price of gasoline. 
A top-down view of this problem would be quite different. The top-down view is that 
many factors enter into the decision about how to use a vehicle, even for such mundane tasks as 
trips to the grocery store and running errands. Convenience, imperfect planning, and the value of 
time all enter into the decision. The best measure of how the consumer will cut back on gasoline 
consumption is to observe how that consumer cut back the last time the price of gasoline 
increased. 
From this example, we can see that the top-down view may very well result in a larger 
cost to reduce gasoline consumption by some fixed amount, relative to the bottom-up approach. 
The bottom-uppers will likely counter that the past is not the correct indicator of the future, and 
that the top-down approach assumes away extant inefficiencies. They would argue, for example, 
that if people are educated about how to manage their car use, they can save more energy than 
they have in the past. 
It is easy to see why these two schools of thought can generate dramatically different 
estimates of the cost of controlling GHGs. It is also easy to see how the bottom-up analyses 
generate negative-cost estimates of control for modest control levels; society can actually save 
money by undertaking some control. 
3.  Costs are Relative 
In a well-publicized paper, Costanza et al. (1997) generated measures of the value of the 
world’s environment, including the air we breathe and the world’s oceans. One of the criticisms 
of this analysis was that economic value is relative and incremental, not absolute and total. The 
value of the air we breathe is defined as the difference in well-being for having air to breathe Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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versus not having air to breathe, which is clearly a large number but a somewhat meaningless 
one. 
Similarly, the costs of GHG control must be relative to some benchmark, particularly if 
considering the fact that costs are not incurred at one point but continue into the foreseeable 
future. If we impose a carbon tax and attempt to measure the cost of this tax in 2020, what are 
the relative costs? Logically, the base is no carbon tax. 
Viewing costs through this lens, it is clear how to deal with preexisting distortions such 
as the inefficiencies connected to the current tax system. The current second-best economy is 
part of the baseline. Additional costs induced by a carbon tax, whether direct or due to an 
exacerbation of inefficiencies from other taxes, are all attributable to the carbon tax policy. 
4.  Estimates of Control Costs 
A number of studies focus on the aggregate cost associated with controlling GHGs or, 
more specifically, CO2. Many of these studies have been done for the United States, where the 
data are more readily available. Hourcade et al. (1996b) provide a very comprehensive, though 
now slightly outdated, review of estimates of the cost of GHG reduction.  
A more up-to-date, though similar, estimate is provided by Weyant and Hill (1999), who 
report on the results of a comparison of different analyses of emission control costs. This 
comparison, conducted under the auspices of the Energy Modeling Forum at Stanford 
University, involved nearly a dozen integrated assessment models adopting the same basic 
assumptions. Different models similarly calibrated are then compared in a number of 
dimensions, including the marginal cost of GHG control. Figure 1 shows the central tendency of 
the estimates of the marginal cost of control for four regions of the world: the United States, the 
European Union, Japan and Canada/Australia/New Zealand.24 Although it is not apparent from 
the figure, there is considerable dispersion around each of these lines, in terms of estimates from 
the different models. For instance, for the United States, the country probably most studied, the 
estimates of the marginal cost of control for 25% reduction range from $60 to $300. Obviously, 
for lower levels of reduction, the dispersion is smaller in absolute terms. 
                                                 
24 What is shown in the figure is the estimate from the MS-MRT model (Bernstein et al. 1999ab), which is very 
close to the median estimates (over all models) of the marginal cost of control. Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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Source: Stanford Energy Modelling Forum data, adapted from Weyant and Hill (1999) with detailed data graciously 
provided by John Weyant. 
 
Figure 1. Central Tendency (Over Several Different Model Estimates) for Selected 
Regions of Marginal Cost of Control of Carbon  
Emissions vs. Percent Reduction in Carbon Emissions  
(1990 US$ per ton of carbon vs. percent reduction from year 2010 baseline) 
Two factors from the figure are worth noting. One is the considerable difference in the 
marginal cost of control for different regions of the world. This difference may be because of the 
endowment of low- versus high-carbon fuels, because of the existing structure of the economy, 
or because the economy may already be relatively noncarbon-intensive, making further 
reductions more difficult. 
The second feature of this figure is that modest carbon control—less than 10%—can 
generally be achieved at marginal costs less than $100 per ton and, in some cases, considerably 
less than $100 per ton of carbon. For comparison, a $100-per-ton carbon tax translates to about 
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$12 per barrel of crude oil, or $0.25 per gallon ($0.06 per liter) of gasoline.25 These figures are 
consistent with typical estimates of the price elasticity of energy demand and the effect such a 
carbon tax would have on the price of energy. 
The costs of carbon sequestration are also relevant to a discussion of the costs of reducing 
greenhouse gas loading to the atmosphere.  Hourcade et al (1996b) report on a number of cost 
studies of sequestration in forests.  There appears to be little consensus among the studies 
reported, with estimates ranging from $5 to $187 per ton of carbon stored (Hourcade et al, 
1996b; p 353).  As noted previously, engineered carbon removal from emission streams coupled 
with sequestration is a speculative but technically feasible long-term possibility, with high costs 
today (hundreds of dollars per ton of carbon removed and stored) but the prospect of lower costs 
in the future. 
B. Benefits of Greenhouse Gas Control 
There are benefits to reining in global GHG concentrations as well as costs. These 
benefits, however, are harder to quantify let alone monetize. The problem is that the climate 
affects just about every dimension of human activity on earth. Furthermore, regional physical 
impacts are highly uncertain – not just in size, but sometimes in sign.  To comprehensively 
characterize what might be the consequences of climate change is daunting to say the least. 
1.  Scope of Benefits. 
Pearce et al. (1996) provide a useful overview of the extent of damages from climate 
change, which, as was stated earlier, is the flipside of the benefits from avoiding climate change 
(see also Smith and Tirpak, 1990 and Fankhauser and Tol, 1996). A good deal of work starts 
from the simplified assumption that climate change involves an increase in the mean temperature 
and/or the mean sea level. A very much smaller body of work addresses issues of increased 
variability or nonincremental changes such as changes in major ocean currents. 
One type of benefit is avoiding the sectoral consequences of avoiding an increase in mean 
temperature in sectors such as agriculture, construction, tourism, and manufacturing. Much of the 
work in quantifying these sectoral effects has focused on agriculture and forestry (e.g., Sohngen 
and Mendelsohn, 1998, 1999), although other sectors may be affected. For instance, it has been 
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suggested that construction will benefit from warmer weather although increased precipitation, 
which often accompanies warming, will cause problems for construction. 
Another benefit of curtailing change occurs from avoiding the loss caused by sea-level 
rise. A number of studies have estimated the cost of sea-level rise; the most obvious is loss of 
land, formerly coastal, inundated after the sea rises (e.g., Yohe et al, 1995, 1996). Others have 
pointed out, however, that the amount of coastal land stays roughly constant, that a new coastline 
replaces the old. What is lost is the inframarginal lands as the coastal area is pushed inland. 
Furthermore, fixed capital (factories, buildings, and infrastructure) and ecosystem values (coastal 
wetlands) could be lost or disrupted because of the rising ocean. 
The energy industry also is expected to be affected by climate change. At the most 
obvious level, demand for air conditioning will increase and demand for space heating may 
decrease. Many electricity producers are also concerned about the reliability of their system, 
particularly in the face of increased variability of weather and an increase in the number of 
extreme events. Transmission lines are particularly vulnerable. 
Water supply infrastructure could also be vulnerable (Frederick and Gleick, 1999). 
Changes in precipitation will clearly change the appropriateness of the current infrastructure of 
dams, reservoirs, and water conveyance. Further, sea-level rise may increase the intrusion of salt 
water into coastal aquifers.  
An impact of climate change on human health is also anticipated. Not only could elevated 
temperatures increase physical stress during hot summers, but disease-carrying insects may 
migrate. It has been suggested that mosquitoes harboring dengue fever and malaria may expand 
their territory and thus increase human population exposure. 
An additional set of benefits are often called "co-benefits."   These are associated with the 
benefits of reducing levels of pollutants whose emissions are positively correlated with 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Typically, reducing greenhouse gas emissions involves reducing fuel 
combustion and thus reducing emission of pollutants associated with fuel combustion (Burtraw 
and Toman, 2001; Ekins, 1996). 
Many nonmarket effects of climate change are also important, ranging from ecosystem 
effects to the amenity value of changed climate. 
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A large number of studies have focused on very narrowly defined sectors and the damage 
from climate change in those sectors. Pearce et al. (1996) review many of these studies. Far 
fewer studies have sought to generate an aggregate estimate of the damage from climate change. 
In fact, most of these studies have focused on the United States, in part because data are more 
readily available and because the bulk of the narrowly defined studies have been carried out in 
the United States. Table II presents a summary of five estimates of damage, hypothesized to 
result from a doubling of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere (note that the consequent 
temperature change varies from study to study). 
An examination of Table II indicates remarkably little agreement in the details, although 
the overall impacts have a relatively narrow range from $55 billion to $140 billion. This is a  Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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Table II. Five Published Estimates of U.S. Climate Change Impacts from a Doubling of 


















Market  impacts:         
Agriculture –1.1  –17.5  –8.4  –10  –1.2 
Energy –1.1  –9.9  –7.9  ––  –5.6 
Sea level  –12.2  –7  –9  –8.5  –5.7 
Timber  ––  –3.3  –7 –– –43.6 
Water ––  –7  –15.6  ––  –11.4 
Total  market  –14.4  –44.7  –41.6 –18.5 –67.5 
Nonmarket 
impacts: 
       
Human  life  –– –5.8  –11.4 –37.4 –9.4 
Migration  ––  –5  –6 –1 –– 
Extreme  events  ––  –8  –2 –3 –– 
Human amenity  ––  ––  ––  –12  –– 
Recreation  ––  –1.7  –– –– –– 
Species loss  ––  –4  –8.4  –5  –– 
Urban 
infrastructure 
––  –1  –– –– –– 
Air pollution  ––  –3.5  –7.3  ––  –27.2 
Water  quality  ––  ––  –– –– –32.6 
Mobile Air 
Conditioning 
––  ––  –– –– –2.5 
Total  nonmarket  –41.1  –16.4  –27.9 –55.7 –71.7 
TOTAL  –55.5  –61.1  –69.5 –74.2 –139.2 
% of 1990 GDP  –1  –1.1  –1.3  –1.5  –2.5 
Source: Mendelsohn and Neumann (1999), adapted from IPCC. 
small fraction (under 2%) of the U.S. GDP. In fact, these results have motivated many authors of 
integrated assessment models, taking their cue from Nordhaus (1994), to view damage from 
climate change in terms of percent loss in GDP. The U.S. percentage loss figures frequently are Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
25 
extrapolated to the rest of the world. Nordhaus (1994) hypothesizes that a 3
oC rise in temperature 
results in a 1.33% loss in world output. Passing a quadratic damage function through the origin 
and this single point estimate of loss allows Nordhaus to completely specify damages as a 
function of the change in the global mean temperature.26 
IV.Fundamental Economics of the Climate Issue 
In this section we lay out the fundamentals of the economic approach to the analysis of 
climate change. These elements underlie so-called integrated assessment (IA) models of climate 
change. Our previous discussion emphasizes that to capture the effects of human activities on the 
climate and the effects of climate change on human well-being, a model must capture the 
following elements: 
•  Human activities generate GHGs and alter land use (for example, forest area),which 
also affects the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere. These activities, by altering 
the chemical composition of the atmosphere, are thought to lead to long-term changes 
in the climate system (temperature level and variability, rainfall patterns, and the 
like). 
•  Changes in the climate system are thought to have consequences for human well-
being. These changes would occur through a variety of channels (productivity of food 
and fiber cultivation, impacts on natural ecological systems, threats to coastal areas, 
human health, and so forth). Thus, a closed loop exists between human impacts on 
climate and climatic impacts on human society. 
•  Responses to these feedback effects can reflect a mix of mitigation (reduced 
emissions, reduced deforestation), and adaptation (before as well as after the fact) 
which makes human well-beings less vulnerable to climatic change. 
•  Time is a critical element of the problem. GHGs accumulate in the atmosphere over 
long periods (decades or even hundreds of years). Capital stock investments that are 
made in response to climate change threats are also long-lived (decadal periods for 
electricity generation or road infrastructure), and long-term technical change is 
                                                 
26 Roughgarden and Schneider 1999 argue that a wider range of damage functions should be considered in assessing 
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another key influence on the cost of response. Thus, a complete economic analysis of 
climate change must be dynamic. 
•  Uncertainty also is a critical element of the problem. The severity of the climate 
change problem includes uncertainty in the mapping from emissions to temperature 
and other climatic changes, and in the impacts of climate change on human well-
being. The costs of reducing emissions, the evolution of new technologies that will 
lower that cost, and the opportunities for adaptation are all uncertain as well. 
Uncertainty further interacts with the dynamic nature of the climate problem in giving 
rise to issues related to irreversibility, as discussed below. Thus, a complete economic 
analysis of climate change must also include stochastic elements. 
Below we first develop a series of increasingly complex economic models that show how 
the field has attempted to analyze efficient degrees of climate change and GHG emissions paths. 
Here, efficient is used in a cost-benefit sense, trading off the present value benefits of avoiding 
climate change with the costs of doing so. We focus in particular on issues related to dynamics, 
irreversibility, learning, and insurance. We then step back from the models to discuss more 
broadly the issues of optimality and efficiency, as economists use these terms, to examine 
climate policies and discuss some more philosophical issues in this debate. 
 
 
A. Simple Models of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change 
We start with the most basic model capable of illustrating some of the key issues 
surrounding climate change.27 Imagine a simple economy in which utility, U, is a function of 
material consumption, c, and the state of the climate as measured simply by average temperature, 
T. U is increasing in c and decreasing in T. We make the standard regularity assumptions on U: 






U U lim , lim
0
, where subscripts denote partial derivatives.28  Utility can be thought 
                                                 
27 One of the earliest models is due to Vousden (1973), though Vousden was not concerned with climate change per 
se. 
28 Neither assumption is strictly speaking necessary; both are used to avoid outcomes in the model in which 
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of in two ways, as a utilitarian welfare function for the entire society (the representation here) or 
as the utility of a representative consumer, in which case consumption levels are on a per capita 
basis (see Kelly and Kolstad 1999). 
The consumption good, which can be thought of initially as fossil energy, is extracted 
costlessly; consumption gives rise to a proportional quantity of GHG emissions,  c E σ = . In this 
simple representation, we start with a stock of the consumption good, which we deplete over 
time. There is also a stock of GHGs in the atmosphere, which follows the dynamic equation 
E M M M + − =
•
δ  (1) 
where  M δ is a decay factor.29 Temperature is related to the stock of GHGs by an increasing 
function 
) (M T Γ =  (2) 
This model obviously presents a very stylized picture of both the processes of climatic change 
and the economy–climate interactions, but it does contain several of the key elements mentioned 
above. It does not address uncertainties surrounding climate change impacts and mitigation, or 
tradeoffs between adaptation and mitigation.30 
The optimal path for human welfare, taking into account material consumption and 
climatic impacts, typically would be associated with the maximization of the present value of 
utility subject to Eqns. 1 and 2 and the constraint on the physical availability of the 
energy/consumption resource. (Again, we return to issues surrounding what constitutes optimal 
outcomes below.) We denote the social discount rate used in the maximization by  ρ . Then, 
using standard dynamic optimization techniques we can show that the optimal path for 
consumption, and thus for GHG emissions, is given by the first-order condition 
σ µ λ + = c U  (3) 
where  0 > λ  is the shadow price associated with the scarcity of the stock of consumption good 
and 0 > µ  is the shadow cost of GHG emissions. The resource shadow price rises at the rate of 
                                                 
29 This is a particularly significant over-simplification of some complex physical processes. 
30 Other optimal growth  models with stock externalities are presented by Bovenberg and Smulders (1996), Farzin 
(1996), Kelly and Kolstad (2001) and Kolstad (1996).  In the 1970's there were a number of theoretical optimal 
growth models developed for dealing with stock pollutants (e.g., see Keeler et al, 1971; Plourde, 1976). Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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discount (consistent with Hotelling’s Rule), while the shadow cost of emissions follows the 
dynamic equation 
) ( ) ( T M U − ⋅ Γ ′ + + =
•
µ δ ρ µ  (4) 
In this simple model, the only response option for the optimization of the consumption 
and GHG emissions paths is to delay consumption, thereby slowing climate change and shifting 
climate change damages into the future when the present value is lower. Equations 3 and 4 show 
how economic and climatic considerations are tied together in determining the optimal paths. 
Equation 3 shows how consumption would be shifted through a charge on consumption in 
addition to the Hotelling scarcity rent. This shadow price reflects the present value of future 
damage from climate change as a result of current consumption, taking into account the decay of 
GHGs in the atmosphere over time. It generally would be expected to grow over time as GHGs 
accumulate but at a decreasing rate as consumption drops because of increasing resource scarcity 
and the rate of climate change slows.  
Imposing the shadow price, through a Pigovian charge on fossil energy consumption, for 
example, reduces current consumption and thus slows the rate of climate change relative to the 
no-regulation case. Note, however, that in this model cumulative GHG emissions are not affected 
by policy because the resource stock is eventually exhausted in any event. The timing of 
emissions is changed, with greater emissions—and more accelerated climate change—occurring 
in the future. This simple example prompts some interesting intertemporal distribution questions, 
which we address below. 
This very simple model can be extended in numerous ways. For example, we could 
introduce a noncarbon “backstop technology” for consumption (switching from coal to solar, for 
example), which has a higher cost of use than fossil energy but eventually becomes economical 
as fossil fuels become scarcer and costlier to produce. In this situation, a policy restricting 
consumption based on use of fossil energy (like a Pigovian carbon tax) will also hasten the 
transition to the backstop and reduce cumulative GHG emissions as well as shift them into the 
future. This example is a special case of a more general model of multiple energy forms with 
different carbon contents (that is coal and natural gas). 
A major extension of the analysis toward greater realism is to consider substitution 
between energy and capital and improved energy efficiency per unit of output, as well as 
substitution among types of energy and reduced energy use per se. To illustrate this scenario, we 
can let d represent climate damages that are positively related to temperature and economic Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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activity, which is denoted by Y. For a given elevation in temperature, damages may well depend 
on the level of economic activity (more activity, more damages). Economic activity (holding 
population and labor force fixed for simplicity) depends on services derived from invested 
capital, K, as well as energy inputs and the state of the climate. For the moment, we assume that 
investment I is irreversible, so that  0 > I , and capital depreciates at the rate  K δ . Assuming for 
simplicity a constant emissions intensity per unit of energy, we can use E to denote exhaustible 
fossil energy as well as emissions (the model is easily extended to incorporate a backstop 
nonfossil energy resource). We can then write, in addition to Eqns. 1 and 2,  
) , ( d c U U =  (5) 
) , ( Y T g d =  (6) 
) , , ( T E K f Y =  (7) 
I K K K + − =
•
δ  (8) 
Note that this framework allows for adverse climate change impacts through reduced 
productivity ( 0 < T f ) as well as through direct impacts on utility.  
The pathways of climate change impacts and the possible responses are more complex 
with the introduction of capital–energy substitution. By rearranging the above relationships we 
can express the economic problem as one of optimal capital investment and GHG emissions. We 
can write the first-order conditions for the problem as follows: 
η = c U  (10) 
µ λ + = + E Y d c f g U U ) (  (11) 
ρ λ λ =
•
/  (12) 
] ) [( ) ( T d T Y d c M g U f g U U + + Γ ′ + + =
•
µ δ ρ µ  (13) 
) ( ) ( Y d c K K g U U f + − + =
•
η δ ρ η  (14) 
Here, as before, λ  denotes the scarcity value of the stock of energy and µ  is the shadow 
price of GHG emissions; in addition, η  is the shadow value of capital investment. The term 
Y d c g U U + , which we assume is positive, can be thought of as the marginal utility of output: Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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Increased consumption raises utility directly but indirectly reduces utility through magnified 
climate damage. Below we discuss how the relationship between utility and climate change can 
be viewed in an even more complex manner. 
Equation 11 represents a modified Hotelling Rule, which takes into account the ways that 
increased GHG emissions give rise to welfare-reducing damages over time. It is easily seen from 
this equation that the marginal product of energy use in the steady state (with  ) 0 =
•
µ is higher 
than in the absence of climate change considerations. This finding suggests (but does not prove) 
that, in the long-term, emissions are lowered by an optimal climate change policy. 
One way this reduction occurs is through substitution of capital for energy. Equation 10 
expresses the standard Ramsey Rule for optimal consumption, which is to equate its marginal 
utility with the shadow value of capital. Equation 14, however, shows that the shadow price of 
capital is affected by climate change; greater investment increases economic activity, but this 
approach also increases the scale of damages. If we substitute Eqn. 10 into Eqn. 14 and set  0 =
•
η  
to look at the steady state, we find that  
0 ) ( < = − + Y d K K K g U f f δ ρ  (15) 
which implies that the steady-state marginal product of capital is smaller than would be optimal 
in the absence of climate change concerns. This finding suggests (but again does not prove) that 
capital investment is larger when energy use is limited to take climate change prospects into 
account. 
One last extension worthy of mention is the incorporation of adaptation as well as 
mitigation activities. Basically, this adaptation involves accumulating knowledge and physical 
capital stocks such that for any given GHG stock and temperature level, the level of economic 
productivity and the direct damages of climate change on household well-being are smaller than 
without the investment. Examples include building flood protection walls and developing 
drought-resistant seeds or new disease-immunization methods. In contrast to what is developed 
above, adaptation also could be assumed to occur naturally as a byproduct of economic growth, 
so that  0 < Y g . The argument here is that wealthier societies are less dependent on the natural 
systems that figure prominently in sustaining welfare in poorer societies. However, at least part 
of this difference is already reflected in differences in capital stock and factor productivity.  
Although the models sketched above are relatively simple, the structure of economy-
climate interactions therein is at the core of most integrated assessment models, which are large-Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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scale applied numerical models of climate and the economy (Weyant et al. 1996). The difference 
is that integrated assessment models have a great deal more detail in particular components of 
the climate–economy system. Atmospheric processes, the production of goods and services, and 
the options for controlling greenhouse gases may be represented at a greater level of detail.    
However, the fundamental structure, at least for integrated assessment models with an economic 
orientation, is as depicted in our simple model. 
B. Uncertainty, Irreversibility, Learning, and Insurance 
Integrated assessment models that explicitly incorporate uncertainty are still the 
exception rather than the rule,31 but uncertainties regarding both the risk of climate change and 
the cost of mitigation are drawing increased attention. These uncertainties assume particular 
interest when the effects of climate change and investments to mitigate those effects are, at least 
to some degree, irreversible. These uncertainties also give rise to a need to understand learning 
and its consequences, because the information decisionmakers possess about climate change 
risks and response costs is hardly static. Finally, uncertainty creates a demand for insurance32 
against the risks of climate change. Our discussion in this subsection focuses on laying out the 
conceptual issues; below we discuss the findings of particular models. 
Uncertainty and irreversibility are discussed in Kolstad (1996a,b) and Narain and Fisher 
(2000); the former paper also addresses learning (see also Manne and Richels 1992). 
Irreversibility means that certain actions may be difficult to reverse because doing so is costly or 
even impossible. More precisely, an asymmetry exists between the benefits of acting and the 
costs of undoing that action. If one expects to acquire information in the future, information that 
might be crucial in determining the advisability of taking an irreversible action, then it is optimal 
to err on the side of not taking irreversible actions, assuming all other things are equal. 
The general problem of irreversibility is that, in the face of uncertainty and long-lived 
impacts, a quasi-option value is associated with the opportunity to delay these impacts until more 
information is available. This value is based on the expected value of the information that will be 
received, conditional on deferring the irreversible action (Fisher, 2000; Hanemann, 1989). In 
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other words, taking the irreversible action degrades the value of the information you may receive 
since there will be less you can do with the information after taking the action. This potential loss 
is the quasi-option value and must be taken into account when contemplating such actions. In the 
case of climate change, the impacts involve both the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere 
and the accumulation of capital investments that cannot readily be reversed. The GHG 
accumulation commits us to the future prospect of a different climate, an outcome that will be 
especially regrettable if climate change impacts prove severe. Long-lived capital investment 
implies the commitment of resources to lower GHG technologies, which cannot be easily 
reallocated if climate change is less severe than expected.  
As Narain and Fisher (2000) note, it is important to characterize more precisely what 
would qualify as irreversibilities in this context. With respect to GHG mitigation, we can 
imagine that irreversibility includes difficulty in transforming capital in place and a slow rate of 
capital depreciation (because capital not easily transformed implies less long-term commitment 
if capital depreciates rapidly). Irreversibility in the context of GHGs can be quite different. In 
particular, limits on the availability of carbon sequestration, or other means to remove GHGs 
from the atmosphere, might imply an irreversibility in GHG emissions (Kolstad 1996a). GHGs 
residing in the atmosphere can be reduced only by slowing new emissions, waiting for existing 
concentrations to decay, or accelerating sequestration. In any case, it is not costless to rapidly 
undo the act of emitting GHGs into the atmosphere.  
The fact that GHGs in the atmosphere decay with time weakens the irreversibility of 
GHG emissions, although the weakening is only modest because of the long time required to 
completely reverse specific emissions. A stronger form of climate change irreversibility arises if 
the atmosphere never recovers, or—equally relevant for economic analysis—the impacts of 
climate change do not reverse over time, even if the atmospheric concentration of GHGs drops.  
As one would expect, investment and climatic irreversibilities pull in opposite directions 
in defining the optimal path of GHGs; investment irreversibility supports the argument for 
delaying some capital expenditures, whereas climatic irreversibility supports the argument for 
more aggressive near-term abatement. In an analysis of this issue, Kolstad (1996a) argues that 
the investment irreversibility is stronger than the emissions irreversibility and thus suggests a 
positive quasi-option value from emission control. This perspective implies the desirability of 
slightly less control relative to the case where learning is ignored. However, no consensus on this 
issue exists (see also Pindyck, 2000). Ulph and Ulph (1997), for instance, argue that 
irreversibilities can lead to over- or under-control, depending on very specific characteristics of 
utility and production functions.  Narain and Fisher (2000) obtain a similar result with their Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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characterization of irreversibilities, including the possibility of modifying existing capital (at 
some cost), that climatic irreversibility may be of more concern. 
C. What Integrated Assessment Models Say 
Empirical integrated assessment models use the basic conceptual structure described 
above with elaborations to better reflect the detail of both energy–economy relationships (which 
influence mitigation costs) and GHG–climate relationships. A number of these frameworks are 
variants of the relatively aggregated optimal growth model with GHG accumulation and damage 
developed by Nordhaus (1993, 1994). Other models provide greater degrees of disaggregation 
regionally, within the energy sector, or both (see for example Weyant et al. 1996, Kolstad 1998, 
Weyant and Hill (1999), Yang (1999). 
Nordhaus (1994) determines the level of emissions that maximizes net benefits of GHG 
control. He also compares these results to other policies, such as stabilizing emissions at 1990 
levels or stabilizing the climate by limiting temperature increases to 1.5
oC over preindustrial 
temperature levels. He finds that optimal control of GHGs results in reduction of emissions of 
9%–13% over levels that would otherwise be expected over the coming century. This estimate 
could be supported by carbon taxes in the $5–$20 range. In contrast, stabilizing emissions at 
1990 levels involves control levels gradually ratcheting up to 60% by 2100 (that is, emissions 
would be reduced by 60% relative to what otherwise would be expected). Stabilizing temperature 
involves a phasing-out of carbon emissions by the middle of this century. As for the cost, 
Nordhaus (1994) estimates that an optimal level of emission control generates net benefits, 
discounted over the coming century, of US$271 billion We are slightly better off as a result of 
this emission control. To put this quantity in perspective, it is 0.04% of the net discounted value 
of global consumption over the century: a gain, but not a big gain. In Nordhaus’ analysis, stricter 
stabilization policies generate significant net economic losses. 
The apparent desirability of letting emissions rise well into the next century, if not 
beyond, is a striking finding and is typical of many IA models (Manne 1996). The models 
indicate that policies pushing for substantial near-term control, like the Kyoto Protocol, involve 
too much cost, too soon, relative to the benefits. Several reasons support this finding. Damages 
rise with the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere, and, according to the estimates in most 
IA models, the costs of sharply reducing GHGs today are too high relative to the benefits. Only 
after the GHG concentration has grown considerably does it make sense, on expected present 
value grounds, to taper off emissions. In addition, the marginal costs of controlling GHGs are Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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relatively insensitive to the stock of GHGs and the level of control. Thus there is no cost penalty 
for deferring emissions control. 
In fact, IA calculations often presume that the unit cost of GHG control in the future may 
be lower than in the present, even if a higher overall level of control is needed in the future. This 
is a consequence of a presumed continuation in trends toward greater energy efficiency in 
developed and developing countries,33 as well as some increased scarcity of fossil fuels and 
falling costs of backstop energy resources. Last, but not least, the finding of IA models in favor 
of delay in GHG control reflects the fact that with discounting, one seeks to backload both 
abatement costs and climate change damages. 
The models referred to above do indicate, as expected, that higher costs of climate change 
imply the desirability of more GHG mitigation. However, the level of mitigation remains less 
than that emphasized in current policy debates, even if the level of marginal damage cost is much 
higher than is conventionally assumed in IA models (see also Peck and Teisberg 1993).  
To explore these issues further, Pizer (1999) uses a model similar to that used by 
Nordhaus (1993) to examine how taking into account a variety of potentially correlated 
uncertainties relate to the climate, the economy, and individual preferences, including the rate of 
time preference. He examines how these uncertainties affect the global emissions path that 
minimizes the expected present value of damage plus control costs. He finds that with these 
uncertainties, the optimal time path is substantially—about 30% more—stringent in restricting 
emissions over the long term compared with the path that results from using best guesses about 
the uncertain parameters. This finding reflects an inherent nonlinearity of the social cost 
function; deviations in the parameters that raise social costs are proportionally more important 
than deviations that lower social costs. However, the results still echo those of other integrated 
assessment models in that the social cost-minimizing emissions path is significantly less 
restrictive than the path implied by the Kyoto Protocol targets. 
A particularly intriguing feature of the analysis is that about half the increased stringency 
is attributable to just one parameter, the rate of time discount in the utility function. This finding 
reinforces the common intuition that the choice of discount rate has a strong influence on the 
optimal climate policy. Pizer further notes that because low discount rates are correlated with a 
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slowdown of economic growth, his results run counter to the conventional wisdom that lower 
economic growth implies less concern about climate change, because emissions growth is 
slower.34 
Pizer’s analysis abstracts from the risk of a catastrophe due to climate change. This 
analysis is the central focus of a paper by Gjerde et al. (1999), who use their own growth-
theoretic integrated assessment model of global economic activity, GHG emissions, and climate 
responses. These authors show that taking into account a risk of catastrophe, which is correlated 
with the future buildup of CO2 in the atmosphere, provides a rationale for current GHG control, 
even if the risk is small and there are no other hazards (ongoing “continuous damages”) posed by 
climate change. At the same time, however, these authors find that including a catastrophe risk 
on top of a smooth damage function does not provide that much additional rationale for GHG 
reduction, unless the risk and severity of the catastrophe are both quite high. In part, this finding 
may reflect the fact that their model finds social-cost-minimizing GHG control to be more 
stringent than in many other assessments, a result the authors attribute to greater optimism about 
GHG control costs in the longer term.  
Gjerde et al. (1999) examine the sensitivity of their results to the probability of 
catastrophe and to the discount rate. Like Pizer, they find that the optimal GHG path is extremely 
sensitive to the choice of discount rate: Optimal emissions continue to rise for 50 years (though 
more slowly than in the absence of climate policy) with a 3% discount rate, whereas optimal 
emissions decline fairly precipitously with a 1% discount rate. It follows that with an 
endogenous catastrophe risk, the probability of catastrophe over the long term is much higher 
with a higher discount rate. As one would expect, a higher probability of catastrophe also implies 
a more stringent control policy. But Gjerde et al. also show that even after taking catastrophe risk 
into account, it is difficult to rationalize in their model the original goal of the Rio Earth Summit, 
namely holding emissions below 1990 levels, unless the catastrophe risk is quite high or the 
social discount rate is lower than the 3% often used in integrated assessment models. Finally, the 
authors’ model confirms another point made in previous studies (for example, Peck and Teisberg 
1993), that the value of improved information about climate risks may be quite substantial (see 
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also, Nordhaus and Popp, 1997).  Roughgarden and Schneider (1999) reformulate DICE to 
include greater uncertainty.  They show that this calls for much more aggressive greenhouse gas 
control. 
Uncertainty need not involve learning. The level of uncertainty can remain fixed over 
time. In such a case, there obviously is no gain from deferring action in order to reduce 
uncertainty. The information available to make a decision will be the same tomorrow as today. 
But when new information is expected, information that may change choices, then the question 
becomes more complex. As mentioned earlier, irreversibilities may imply that some abatement 
actions will degrade the value of future information, suggesting moderation in abatement efforts. 
However, as Epstein (1980) and others (for example, Freixas and Laffont 1984, Zhao and 
Zilberman 1999, Kolstad 1996b) have shown the direction of the bias is not always towards 
moderation. The most that can be taken from the theoretical literature is that the precise 
implications of learning can be understood only with empirical analysis. 
Several authors have attempted to determine the consequences of learning for optimal 
GHG control. As was mentioned earlier, Kolstad (1993, 1994, 1996a,b) and Kelly and Kolstad 
(1999) examine the optimal level of current emission control with and without learning. Implicit 
in these analyses is a simple Nordhaus-type optimal growth model with a single capital good. 
Investment in emission control has elements of irreversibility in that once investment occurs, it 
becomes a sunk cost. Similarly, GHG emissions can only be “un-emitted” by waiting the decades 
or centuries necessary for the stock to decay naturally. The no-uncertainty, no-learning result is 
that current (1995) GHG emissions should optimally be reduced by about 8% relative to un-
controlled levels. Introducing learning and uncertainty reduces this figure 5%–7%, depending on 
the level of learning. Thus the control capital irreversibility appears to dominate the 
irreversibility of GHG emissions.  
This concept can be understood by using the terminology of Ulph and Ulph (1997): Only 
“effective” irreversibilities yield any bias in optimal actions. An effective irreversibility is one 
that is likely to bind. The irreversibility associated with GHG emissions is that one might like to 
reduce the stock of GHGs in the future. However, nearly all states of the world in the models 
simply involve reducing emission levels to slow the growth of the GHG stock. Desiring to 
actually reduce the stock is unlikely. Thus the GHG stock irreversibility has little effect on the 
optimal current period action. Narain and Fisher (2000) find a stronger GHG stock effect by 
including an endogenous probability of an environmental catastrophe. 
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The focus throughout the discussion above has been on balancing the present value of 
benefits and costs in designing climate policy. This line of analysis has had relatively little 
impact on policy debates so far; we suspect this reaction is due partly to doubts about the 
completeness of economic damage estimates and partly to philosophical disagreements with the 
approach of associating optimal climate trajectories with the present value of net benefits. 
However, another line of research concerned with the optimal timing for achieving a long-term 
GHG concentration target has had a somewhat stronger impact on the policy debate.  
Because climate change is a long-term issue, policy discussion often has focused on 
different targets for the long-term GHG concentration in the atmosphere. The concentration prior 
to the start of the Industrial Revolution has been estimated to be around 280 ppmv35 of carbon, 
and that concentration had risen by the late 1990s to more than 360 ppmv. A good deal of the 
noneconomic debate over climate control has been couched in terms of stabilizing concentrations 
at some level between 450 (tough to achieve) and 750 (much easier to achieve). In earlier stages 
of the climate policy debate, most policy scenarios, such as those put forward by the IPCC, 
simply presumed an immediate departure from the business-as-usual (BAU) path. However, 
Wigley, Richels, and Edmonds (1996, hereafter WRE) show that other paths lead to the same 
long-term GHG concentrations. They also show that the paths with less short-term reduction 
balanced by greater GHG reduction in the future could achieve the same long-term 
environmental objectives at a much lower present value cost (on the order of 50% less or more in 
some cases). Since WRE’s paper, numerous analyses have expanded on the theme (see, for 
example, Manne and Richels 1997).  
The reasons for the lower cost in many ways parallel the reasoning for optimal GHG 
paths described above. Part of the reason for the lower cost is the advantage of deferring costs to 
the future, when their present value is lower. Leaving aside the time value of money, only a 
modest cost disadvantage is associated with doing more control later rather than spreading 
control costs out over time starting now. But beyond pure timing, several other advantages of 
delay figure prominently in WRE’s analysis. Delay allows a more gradual evolution of the 
capital stock, with less premature obsolescence and lower adjustment costs. It also allows greater 
opportunities for deployment of more energy-efficient capital, assuming continuation of trends 
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toward greater energy efficiency. Finally, earlier emissions have more time to decay and thus 
contribute less toward elevating the long-term GHG concentration in the atmosphere. 
Critics of the WRE finding (see, for example, Grubb et al. 1995, Ha-Duong et al. 1997) 
have raised both substantive and political economy concerns. Substantively, the critics have 
questioned the size of the near-term cost of GHG reductions, an issue discussed in the previous 
section. Critics also have noted that delay increases the risk that rapid and costly GHG reduction 
would be needed in the future if climate change is found to be a more serious threat. This 
argument is true in principle but, as already noted, it has force only if risks are found to be 
catastrophic and imminent. It is a costly, risk-averse strategy to hedge against this possibility 
while foregoing significant cost savings in other states of the world. 
A more engaging criticism is that limiting near-term GHG reductions provides 
excessively weak signals for inducing the very technology innovation presumed by WRE and 
others as a rationale for delay, while allowing greater “lock-in” of GHG-intensive technology 
that is costlier to alter later. This criticism is no doubt true to a degree; the question is the extent 
to which this condition is a problem and what the are options for overcoming it. If a more 
gradual emissions control path generates significant cost savings, some of these savings can be 
invested in promoting R&D. As for the degree to which innovation is retarded, Goulder and 
Mathai (2000) find that the presence of induced technological change generally lowers the time 
profile of the carbon taxes required to obtain alternative concentration targets. The impact of the 
induced technological change on the least-cost abatement path varies. When knowledge is gained 
through R&D investments, some abatement is shifted from the present to the future, thereby 
supporting the notion of backloading. When knowledge is gained through learning by doing, 
however, the impact on the timing of abatement is ambiguous. Another aspect of that 
perspective, according to Kelly et al. (2000), is that aggressive control of GHG emissions makes 
learning about the climate more difficult because the greenhouse “signal” is diluted. Their result 
is quite qualified, however, and stops short of suggesting that emissions control should be 
moderated to increase learning. Clearly, further research is needed on these issues. 
E. Philosophical Justifications for Climate Policy 
Ultimately the strength of the economic approach to analysis of climate change risk 
depends on the extent to which its prescriptions accord with the way people actually perceive the 
risks, costs, and policy options. Three main types of criticism have been leveled at the economic 
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evaluate risks as presumed in the economic model. Although there is reason to wonder about the 
capabilities of the standard expected utility model to describe how people evaluate low-
probability, high-severity events as might occur as a result of climate change (see, for example, 
Camerer and Kunreuther 1989, Viscusi 1992), the economic approach is both logically consistent 
and relevant to the problem of climate change.  Moreover, other paradigms are equally plagued 
in practice with problems related to uncertainty, and there is no consensus on an approach that 
can do better. So we put aside this general critique and focus more on specific concerns related to 
the nature of the climate change threat.  
One such critique is that the economic model presumes too much substitutability between 
the different forms of “natural capital” that could be degraded by climate change and 
compensatory investments in knowledge, technology, and built capital. As a result, the argument 
goes, economists understate the cost of climatic change and overstate the potential for 
adaptation. This criticism is of course difficult to either prove or refute a priori. There is growing 
evidence of a capacity to adapt to climate change in areas where humans have a significant 
capacity to manage the ecological system. As discussed previously, agriculture and forestry are 
two examples; another example might be the development of means to avoid or treat tropical 
diseases whose incidence would be raised by climate change.  
Adaptation capacity is linked to societal wealth and infrastructure, which means that 
limited adaptation is at least in part a problem of poverty, not an inherent problem. We can be 
less confident about adaptation capacity when the impact involves parts of the ecological system 
where humans have less control, such as with biodiversity. This aspect represents a challenge for 
future research. (It is also worth noting that the issue of limits on substitution is a double-edged 
sword. Positing limited substitution opportunities also means a high cost of reducing fossil fuel 
emissions for the current generation, reducing society’s willingness to invest in limiting future 
climate change.) 
The other critique we address relates to intergenerational fairness. Critics of IA models 
note that the advantages of slow response to rising GHG concentrations reflects, at least in part, 
the effect of discounting and that, given the long time horizons involved, such delay reflects 
intergenerational wealth transfers, not just rational allocation of expenditures over one generation 
(Howarth 1996, 1998). The argument implies that to the extent deferral of policy response 
reduces the well-being of future generations, the application of the present value criterion gives 
rise to ethical concerns. Emanating from this point is a complex maze of arguments concerning 
how benefits and costs should be discounted over time in assessing climate change risks and 
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Advocates of the conventional economic approach offer several defenses of present-value 
cost–benefit analysis (see, for example, Weitzman 1999). If economic progress continues, future 
generations will be better off than the current generation. If economic progress were impeded by 
climate change, a variety of ways would exist to make compensating investments in addition to 
GHG mitigation at present. We do no favors to our descendants, this reasoning suggests, if we 
invest in GHG mitigation with a lower social return (as we reckon it) than other options. This 
argument explicitly assumes a significant substitutability between natural capital adversely 
affected by climate change and other assets. Finally, the evidence concerning intergenerational 
altruism is itself ambiguous, or else aid to disadvantaged persons today would be greater 
(Schelling 1997). 
Unfortunately, our empirical understanding of all these matters is limited. It does seem 
clear that to evaluate the economic cost of GHG measures, discount rates that reflect the 
appropriate intertemporal opportunity cost—whatever that may be—should be used. As for what 
level of investment is appropriate given the uncertain future risks of climate change and our 
uncertain degree of intergenerational altruism, only time and a great deal more political debate 
will tell. 
Critics have proposed alternative criteria to replace benefit–cost analysis. However, the 
alternative approaches are actually particular ways to weigh the benefits and costs of policies, 
given uncertainties, risks of irreversibilities, risk aversion, and distributional concerns. For 
example, the precautionary principle seeks to avoid undue harm to the climate system, and cost 
considerations are absent or secondary. This approach is equivalent to assuming that a sharp 
jump exists in the damages beyond the proposed threshold. This situation may be the case, but as 
yet no clear evidence exists for assuming that damages have this property (let alone for locating 
the level of climate change at which such a jump would occur). 
“Knee of the cost curve” analysis seeks a rule for limiting emission reductions at a point 
where marginal costs increase rapidly. Benefit estimation is set aside in this approach because of 
uncertainty. The approach implicitly assumes that marginal damages from climate change do not 
increase much as climate change proceeds, and that costs could escalate rapidly from a poor 
choice of emissions target. Whereas costs will indeed increase with the stringency of control, if 
the benefits of action are not considered, a sound decision cannot be ensured.  
Benefits and costs are unavoidable; how differently people choose to weigh the impacts 
separates one approach from another. Thus, we maintain throughout this discussion that the 
assessment and weighing of costs and benefits is an inherent part of any policy decision, Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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something that cannot and should not be avoided by appealing to any oversimplified decision 
criteria. 
V.Designing Climate Policy Instruments 
Economic analysis of climate policy design has focused mainly on the application of 
incentive-based instruments for GHG abatement, such as charges for carbon emissions, tradable 
permit or credit systems, or hybrid policies (discussed below).36 As standard theory indicates, 
such policies create tangible financial reasons and provide flexible means to reduce carbon 
emissions at lower cost. They also provide incentives for innovations that reduce costs of future 
GHG abatement. Specific responses to incentive-based policies include: 
•  switching to less carbon-intensive fuels (for example, natural gas for coal) 
•  increasing energy efficiency per unit of output by using less energy-intensive 
technologies 
•  adopting technologies to reduce the emissions of other GHGs (assuming these other 
gases are covered in the tax program) 
•  reducing the production of what are now higher-cost carbon-intensive goods 
•  increasing the sequestration of carbon through reforestation and other measures 
•  developing and refining new technologies for avoiding GHG emissions (for example, 
renewable energy resources). 
Because the basic theory of these policies is familiar, we focus here on specific issues 
that arise in applying these tools to GHG abatement, both domestically and internationally. 
These include cost-effectiveness, performance in the face of uncertainty, incentives for 
innovation and distributional concerns.37  Toward the end of this section we also consider the 
                                                 
36 Energy policies and GHG policies are related, but they are not the same thing.  For example, a uniform tax on 
energy would be inefficient from a GHG control perspective because it would excessively penalize lower-carbon 
energy forms.  Moreover, R&D policies directed at overcoming market failures in the development of new 
technologies may or may not favor lower-carbon energy forms.  Reforms of energy subsidies will reduce energy use 
generally but could still favor more or less carbon intensive fuels.   
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need for a technology policy distinct from GHG regulation, as well as policy to promote 
adaptation. Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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A. Designing Incentive-Based GHG Abatement Policy: Fundamentals 
Taxing carbon is done most easily in an indirect fashion, by taxing fossil fuels.38 The 
carbon content of the fuels is easily ascertained, and at present no cost-effective option exists for 
“end-of-pipe” carbon abatement (“scrubbing”). A fossil fuel tax could be collected in several 
ways: as a severance tax on domestic fossil fuel output plus an equal tax on imports or as a tax 
on primary energy inputs levied on refineries, gas transportation systems, and coal shippers, or 
further downstream. The further upstream (closer to extraction) the tax is levied, the less carbon 
leaks out through uncovered activities like oil-field processing, and the smaller the number of 
sources to be regulated. The tax would be relatively straightforward to administer in the United 
States and most other developed countries, given the existing tax collection apparatus. Tax 
implementation would be more challenging in those developing countries with ineffectual 
institutions for levying taxes and monitoring behavior, or where the fiscal system is not 
transparent and there is the prospect of offsetting hidden subsidies (see da Motta et al, 1999). 
Trading carbon is somewhat more complicated than a carbon tax. The most 
straightforward policy operates upstream by requiring those who produce or import the fossil 
fuels to have permits (Fischer et al. 1998, Hargrave 1998). A more downstream approach would 
focus first on larger sources like power plants. Excluding other sources threatens the cost-
effectiveness of the program. However, capturing more emissions would require the costly 
extension of emissions permit trading to small sources, or other policies that cover the sources 
not in the larger-source trading system (for example, fuel taxes or efficiency standards). This 
policy could easily lead to differential shadow prices of carbon across sectors, also undermining 
the cost-effectiveness of the system.  
Why then are policies other than a carbon tax or upstream trading seriously being 
considered? One reason, to which we return below, is that some advocates in the policy process 
do not have faith in the ability of market signals to produce desired outcomes (at least not on 
their own). The other reason has to do with distributional and political economy issues. Carbon 
taxes and upstream carbon permits are fairly transparent signals of regulatory-induced scarcity. 
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Other policies may be less transparent in their impacts, including downstream permits that are 
distributed gratis. 
How to distribute permits is another key issue in carbon trading (upstream or 
downstream). Instead of issuing them gratis (for example, through “grandfathering” to existing 
emitters), a government could auction permits to the highest bidder. Cramton and Kerr (2001) 
discuss potential auction designs. The choice forces policymakers to address tradeoffs among 
goals of economic efficiency, distributional equity, and political feasibility. Efficiency increases 
with auctioning because the revenues can be used to offset existing distortionary taxes. Parry et 
al. (1999) estimate that a nonrevenue-raising carbon-trading policy could significantly increase 
the net social cost of compliance, possibly making the overall emission reduction program a 
welfare loss rather than a welfare gain. Hoel (1998) shows that revenue-raising policies used to 
offset other taxes can have positive effects on employment in a less than full employment 
economy. 
However, gratis permit allocation can target the distribution of a valued commodity 
toward people most adversely affected by the policy (for example, low-income households, coal 
miners) or those wielding the greatest political influence over the distribution of trading profits 
and losses. Another possibility is that the allocation can become a political bargaining chip in the 
policy debate, winning support from emitters who stand to gain under some proposed allocation 
system, including recipients of permits who do not have a particularly strong claim to 
compensation on equity grounds. This system, no doubt, can increase the political feasibility of a 
trading policy. Bovenberg and Goulder (2000) provide some simulation analyses suggesting that 
efficiency is sacrificed from compensating fossil fuel producing companies and their 
shareholders for losses stemming from reduced sales under a trading system is not that large. The 
price tag gets bigger, of course, if one also seeks to compensate fossil fuel intensive industries 
and the affected workers.  
Which GHGs to cover, beyond CO2, is another issue that trading and taxation policies 
must address. For instance, the appropriate tax on natural gas entering the pipeline system could 
account for leakage and the greater relative potency of methane as a greenhouse gas. Levies or 
permit requirements could also be placed on methane releases from coal mines and landfills and 
on human-manufactured gases based on their expected recycling or venting to the atmosphere 
through sources like auto air conditioners. Some gases will be more difficult than others to cover. 
A prime example is how to capture decentralized sources of agricultural methane that would be 
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Tax or trading systems could also be extended to carbon sequestration activities such as 
reforestation programs that could earn tax credits or garner tradable emissions offsets (see the 
papers in Sedjo et al. 1997). One important challenge here is to define credible measures of the 
level of carbon sequestered by a forestry project. Part of this difficulty reflects unpredictable 
natural variability in carbon storage. Moreover, one does not want a system that rewards carbon 
sequestration that would have occurred anyway as part of forest rotation practices, or a system 
that encouraged deforestation so that landowners could then claim credit for regrowing trees. 
Moreover, increased forest preservation in one location could simply stimulate more tree cutting 
elsewhere; or increased timber supplies as a consequence of expanded forest areas could drive 
down stumpage prices and increase demand for wood products. 
These baseline and “leakage” issues need to be addressed in ascertaining what carbon 
credits would be awarded to sequestration activities. Note that these issues arise at two 
geographic scales – the level of specific sequestration projects, and the national level.  With a 
proper accounting system, it is possible to develop tolerably accurate measures of changes in net 
carbon storage in forests at a national level (Noble and Scoles 2001).39  At least in principle, 
then, credits can be given for increases in carbon storage relative to some historical baseline, 
while purchase of carbon permits could be required for changes in land use that cause release of 
carbon.  At a project level, in contrast, issues of baseline and leakage are harder to sort out, and 
some rules of thumb likely would be needed.  
B. Price Versus Quantity Policies: “Hybrids” 
There is a longstanding debate in the environmental economics literature of price versus 
quantity instruments to address environmental problems (Cropper and Oates, 1992).  The widely 
recognized argument by Weitzman (1974) holds that taxes fix the price and allow the emissions 
levels to vary, creating uncertainty about the environmental outcome though the firm will know 
its cost of compliance. In contrast, permits fix the emission target and allow the price to vary, 
creating compliance cost uncertainty because the price of a permit is not known in advance.  
Pizer (1997, 1999), Hoel and Karp (1998), and Newell and Pizer (1998) extend the 
Weitzman argument to show that a tax is likely to be more efficient than a permit-trading system 
in the face of uncertainty. Given any particular GHG concentration, the marginal damage 
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associated with any particular emissions rate is essentially constant.40 This finding means little 
social loss from having abatement vary with the marginal cost under a tax policy, but a 
potentially large loss from having a fixed abatement requirement in the face of cost uncertainty. 
The argument would be different in light of a strong reason to limit GHG concentrations below a 
certain limit because of the risk of catastrophic damages. But too little evidence exists at this 
time to reach such a conclusion.  
It is also possible to use a hybrid policy based on GHG trading, but with a safety valve if 
costs go too high (Pizer 2001). In practice, this policy would involve the government issuing 
additional permits if the price went beyond some predetermined level (which could change over 
time).41 Pizer (1999) shows that such a policy can essentially equal the efficiency of a carbon tax.  
The choice of price versus quantity policy also depends on how these options affect the 
rate of innovation.  Fischer et al. (1998)  show that the performance of either policy in 
encouraging innovation depends on a number of factors.  In addition to the slopes of marginal 
environmental damage and abatement cost, these factors include the degree to which abatement 
innovations can be imitated (or, conversely, the degree to which an innovator can appropriate 
innovation rents from other potential users).  Their analysis shows that neither price nor quantity 
policy options necessarily dominate with respect to impacts on innovation. 
As noted above, quantity and price policies also may vary in their distributional 
implications, depending on how they are designed. These differences arise prominently in 
considering international implementation of GHG policies, as discussed below. 
C. Intertemporal Flexibility and GHG Policy Design 
Rules for banking and borrowing carbon permits (over time) are another key component 
of a trading system. Viewed as short-term measures, banking and borrowing lower compliance 
costs by allowing hedging against risks in emissions patterns (for example, a colder than average 
                                                 
40 This follows from the fact that an increase in the emissions rate at any point in time will have only an 
insignificant nugatory effect on GHG concentrations, and thus on damage. As concentrations rise, the argument of 
Newell and Pizer (1998) would imply an increase in the optimal carbon tax given a rising marginal damage as a 
function of concentrations. 
41 A policy for U.S. implementation of a safety valve system is sketched in Kopp et al (1999). If permits are 
internationally traded, rules would be needed to prevent entities in the United States from selling off all their “base” 
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winter) and smoothing out fluctuations in abatement costs over time. The Kyoto Protocol 
provides a very limited amount of such flexibility by allowing Annex I countries to average their 
emissions over a five-year commitment period (2008–2012). 
Bigger questions arise in considering banking and borrowing over longer periods (Leiby 
and Rubin 2000; Parkinson et al, 1999). Banking will be attractive to permit holders whenever 
the expected rate of increase in incremental GHG abatement cost is higher than the interest rate 
(the carrying cost of banked permits). On the one hand, such arbitrage opportunities could be 
seen as a sign of an intertemporally cost-ineffective time path of abatement targets, a path that 
does not minimize the present value cost of achieving a long-term GHG concentration target. On 
the other hand, it is possible that such a path is efficient when taking into account both climate 
change avoidance benefits and compliance costs. In this case, banking allows for an inefficient 
acceleration of climate change in the future when banked permits are released.  
Borrowing could also cause some short-term acceleration of climate change by delaying 
emissions reductions, though this issue does not seem that significant in practice. More difficult 
is the fundamental issue of how to make emissions borrowing compatible with credible long-
term policy targets. Borrowing will be attractive to permit holders when short-term policy goals 
are tight relative to long-term policy goals. In principle, one could circumvent this problem with 
the design of an intertemporal GHG trading program. In particular, policy could set a long-term 
GHG concentration target and let private actors hit the target most cost-effectively by adjusting 
their abatement strategies to minimize costs over time (see, for instance, Kosobud et al. 1994, 
Peck and Teisberg 1998).42 Such an approach has numerous advantages in terms of cost 
reduction. Shifting the time profile of emissions control toward the future, while still achieving 
long-term stabilization of the atmosphere at some desired GHG concentration, means less 
premature capital obsolescence and more opportunities to take advantage of technical progress in 
energy efficiency. The resulting intertemporal cost savings could be very large, on the order of 
50% or more (Manne and Richels 1997). 
But there is reason to doubt the credibility of such long-term targets and thus the 
enforceability of an intertemporal GHG trading system with an arbitrary concentration target. 
                                                 
42 In practice, one would not want GHGs to trade one-for-one over time. The reason is earlier emissions have a 
longer time to be removed from the atmosphere by natural processes than later emissions, so earlier emissions have 
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The dilemma is a classic example of a commitment problem. Current decisionmakers see 
economic benefits from delaying emissions control. But they cannot bind their successors to 
undertake the more stringent control measures needed to achieve the long-term concentration 
target. The no-commitment equilibrium becomes one in which each successive set of 
decisionmakers pursues policies that are optimal for them, without presuming that the future will 
pay back any “carbon debt” they accumulate. 
In other words, the equilibrium becomes what is predicted by the integrated assessment 
models, which, as noted previously, indicate the desirability of far larger emissions (less 
abatement) over the short-to-medium term than in the Kyoto Protocol. These observations 
suggest that it may be more straightforward simply to negotiate targets over time that are 
consistent with the willingness to pay and bear the resulting costs, as opposed to setting more 
ambitious short-term limits and then inventing policies to circumvent them.  
D. International GHG Policy Design 
Incentive-based GHG policies can be extended beyond national boundaries.  Various 
forms of emissions trading can be used internationally (Wiener 1999, 2001).  It is also possible in 
principle to envisage internationally coordinated carbon taxes (Hoel 1993).  Theory says that 
such policies can generate more cost-effective outcomes than policies with less “where 
flexibility” (Manne and Richels, 1999; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000).  Carbon taxes explicitly 
make the location of abatement endogenous, based on differences in marginal abatement cost. 
GHG trading operates by allowing low-cost producers of surplus permits or credits to profit from 
selling permits to high-cost buyers, again achieving an endogenous cost-effective allocation of 
control effort. 
Both approaches can, in principle, generate cost-effective results. The predicted cost 
savings from trading are very substantial, on the order of 50% or more in many instances 
(Weyant and Hill 1999). However, these predicted cost savings overstate the realizable savings, 
because they ignore real-world imperfections in the operation of the mechanisms. There are 
important practical issues of implementation, distributional implications, and governance 
surrounding both taxes and trading. Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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The dilemma with carbon taxes (other than the uncertainty about quantitative abatement 
outcomes) is their distributional implications.43 Equalized carbon tax rates will have significantly 
different cost implications for different economies, depending on their per capita incomes and 
energy intensity. In particular, one could imagine that developing countries might find onerous 
the domestic cost burden of a high internationally agreed carbon tax.  The domestic cost burden 
would be associated with the restrictions in energy use and associated investments caused by the 
tax, not the tax revenues themselves.  Faced with these costs burdens, developing countries 
might demand compensation through some international redistribution of tax revenues. It is 
difficult to imagine how in practice such a redistribution might be achieved. However, 
differentiating national carbon tax rates creates a new and troubling source of international 
inefficiency in resource allocation. 
International GHG trading is not easily made compatible with a diversity of domestic 
GHG policies (Hahn and Stavins 1999). Formal international trading of emissions quotas 
presumes some kind of domestic allowance programs to be smoothly implemented. In principle, 
more informal trading of project-level emissions credits (see the discussion of “joint 
implementation” in Section E below) could be used with heterogeneous domestic policy 
measures.  In practice, however, this approach also poses several difficulties.44 
Our last issue in this section involves the distributional implications of trading policies in 
relation to carbon taxes (discussed above). Wiener (1999) examines the impact on regulatory 
instrument choice of two basic legal parameters that differ between national and global settings: 
voting rules and implementation structures. In a domestic context a regulator can impose either 
mechanism by fiat. However, international climate treaties depend on countries’ voluntary assent 
and on implementation through national governments. Wiener argues that international transfers 
to developing countries are crucial for expanding participation in GHG control and stabilizing 
                                                 
43 It might also be possible for governments with less-than-transparent fiscal systems to hide cheating on their 
carbon taxes through hidden rebates. Governments also might want to signal they have high costs of GHG control to 
increase their perceived need for revenue redistribution. In contrast, a government in a position to profit by the sale 
of GHG credits has an incentive to behave as efficiently as possible in abatement (Wiener 1999).  
44 Hahn and Stavins (1999) further describe the practical difficulties of operating a transaction-specific, credit-based 
joint implementation program internationally with heterogeneous domestic GHG measures and points out the 
tradeoff between international cost-effectiveness and domestic policy sovereignty this engenders. For example, JI 
creates arbitrage opportunities if a country’s domestic carbon tax is higher than the price of JI credits; these credits 
can be used to offset domestic carbon tax liability. This can be ameliorated only by harmonizing the carbon tax with 
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the atmosphere, and that such transfers are accomplished more flexibly, effectively, and 
politically safely by the international allocation of GHG rights and their sale through market 
channels than through intergovernmental redistribution of carbon tax revenues.  Babikar et al 
(2000) use a computable general equilibrium model to conclude that the burden of Kyoto falls 
mainly on energy-exporting countries. 
Cooper (1998) takes vigorous issue with the plausibility of international agreement on 
emissions trades. He notes that such an agreement would require a grand bargain for the division 
of vast wealth, and he views the chances of such a bargain as remote. Instead, he argues that 
GHG policy coordination should focus on urging countries to pursue individual carbon taxes 
without redistribution. However, if one is less sanguine than Cooper about the prospects that 
developing countries would impose substantial carbon taxes on their own, and if one rejects 
differentiated tax rates as too distorting, one is left with a policy solution that involves a very 
limited commitment to GHG control. Because the levels of national commitment would be so 
limited, the difficulties in getting agreement on the distribution of carbon quotas also would be 
reduced. 
E. Emission Trading in the Kyoto Protocol 
One of the striking features of the Kyoto Protocol is the explicit incorporation of 
mechanisms for different forms of emissions trading.  Superficially at least, a permit system 
seems to fit naturally into the Kyoto Framework Convention, which has focused on fixed 
emissions targets and timetables (McKibbon et al, 1999).  
Formal trading of Annex I national emissions quotas (presumably devolved to 
nongovernmental market participants to reap the advantages of emissions trading) is one option 
under the Kyoto Protocol. This option is the closest to the textbook version of an allowance-
trading program.  
Another option for Annex I trading is so-called joint implementation (JI). This approach 
involves project-level credit generation from emission-reducing actions in other Annex I 
countries.  
The third mechanism is another bilateral project-specific option for credit generation, the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Under the CDM, emissions reduction activities in 
noncapped, non-Annex I nations can generate emission reduction credits for Annex I nations. In 
principle, the CDM could generate both low-cost emission reductions for developed countries Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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and tangible benefits to the host country through the transfer of modern and low-carbon emission 
technology.45  
The practical issues with these mechanisms concern the performance of the institutions, 
their compatibility with domestic policies, and their distributional impacts. A concern with 
Annex I trading and JI is how to ensure that emission trading does not subvert national emission 
limits. This situation would occur if a country were a net seller of permits or credits and not 
meeting its own Kyoto obligations, thereby “exporting” its own noncompliance.  
Because both parties are Annex I countries, either or both could be held responsible 
under the Kyoto Protocol. Holding selling countries liable focuses responsibility directly on the 
parties in a position to address the problem and ensures that all credits or permits are more or less 
equally reliable, thereby reducing the transaction costs of trading. Seller liability measures can be 
implemented before the fact, by requiring all countries to show they have the domestic 
regulatory capability to limit emissions, and after the fact, by suspending selling privileges for 
violators. If seller liability is infeasible politically, holding buyers liable when a selling country is 
found not to have stayed within its treaty limit is another option. But this situation greatly 
complicates the operation of the trading system, as the “pedigree” of different credits or permits 
must be assessed, and individual buyers must undertake expensive insurance (for example, 
holding extra credits) against risks that lie beyond the control of any abatement projects they 
may personally undertake.46  
Among the key immediate questions surrounding both CDM and JI is how to design a 
credible monitoring and enforcement system that does not impose such high transaction costs 
that it chokes off projects and credit trades. People will not start a project if the time, effort, and 
financial outlays to seek, negotiate, consummate, and obtain governmental approvals are too 
onerous. This case is especially challenging in the context of the CDM, where other investment 
risks may be high in any event and where the heterogeneity of project types makes it difficult to 
define a reasonable baseline against which emission controls and credits can be assessed.  
This situation in turn draws attention to the dilemmas associated with enforcing 
environmental integrity in the CDM. Because the non-Annex I host country does not have a 
                                                 
45 For further discussion of the CDM see, for example, Goldemberg (1998), Jepma and van der Gaast (1999), Grubb 
et al. (1999), Bohm and Carlén (1999) and Haites and Yamin (forthcoming). 
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national emission cap, there is no analogue of national seller liability with Annex I trading that 
can be used to help support compliance. Only project-level liability can operate. In this context, 
it may make sense to hold Annex I investors or credit purchasers liable for project performance, 
even though this policy introduces the problem of quality-differentiated abatement credits noted 
earlier. The reason is that Annex I investors or purchasers are subject to whatever compliance 
measures their governments have instituted; and they may have more at stake in the project 
economically, thus giving them a stronger incentive to carefully manage project performance 
risks (Kerr 2001). [**CHECK TAR] A further dilemma for international overseers of these 
mechanisms is that both investor and host have incentives to exploit project-level informational 
advantages and the lack of a national emissions ceiling in the host country to misrepresent 
project performance (Hagem 1996).  
 
F. Nonincentive-Based Policies  
As already noted, incentive-based policies work to induce the diffusion of existing lower-
carbon technology and the development of new technology. This approach leads to the question 
of whether additional non-market-based policies are necessary to adequately promote climate-
friendly technology advance and investment. Proponents of such policies argue that economic 
incentives are inadequate to change behavior to a degree sufficient to reduce climate risk. They 
advocate public education and demonstration programs; institutional reforms, such as changes in 
building codes and utility regulations; and technology mandates, such as fuel economy standards 
for automobiles or utilization of renewable energy sources for power generation (see Jaffe et al, 
forthcoming; Weyant and Olavson, 1999). 
No one doubts that such approaches might eventually reduce GHG emissions. At issue is 
the cost-effectiveness of such programs. Advocates of technology mandates often argue that the 
subsequent costs are negligible because the realized energy cost savings more than offset the 
initial investment costs. But this view implies a lack of rational decision-making by energy users  
in that it does not address several other factors that impinge on technology choices. Most 
economic analyses recognize that energy use suffers from inefficiencies, and that some low-cost 
opportunities for improved energy efficiency do exist.  However, these analyses lead to 
skepticism that there are large no-regret gains (for a review of recent ;literature on this subject 
see Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2001).  Economic analyses also acknowledge a role for 
government when consumers have inadequate access to information or if existing regulatory Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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institutions are poorly designed. This role can include subsidies to basic R&D to compensate for 
an imperfect patent system; reform of energy-sector regulation and reduction of subsidies that 
encourage uneconomic energy use; and provision of information about new technological 
opportunities (Jaffe et al. 2001; Schneider and Goulder, 1997).  
The economic perspective emphasizes the search for real inefficiencies in markets that 
impede low-cost choices, as distinct from barriers reflecting unavoidable direct or hidden costs 
including the capacity of technologies to predictably meet user needs. Some failures in the 
market are apparent, such as energy subsidies that encourage wasteful use, inefficient regulation 
of the electricity sector, inadequate private-sector incentives for R&D, and shortages of 
information for purchasers to use in making informed investments. Other barriers are more 
controversial.47 
In developing countries, substantial pricing distortions in energy markets and other 
barriers that stall the diffusion of cost-effective technology can exist (see Lopez, 2001). These 
barriers can be compounded by other economy-wide policy and infrastructure problems. Where 
barriers to technology diffusion exist, there is an opportunity for market reforms that improve 
economic efficiency and environmental performance.48  This strategy will likely out-perform 
regulatory mandates for technology diffusion and adoption.  
VI.  Economics and International Climate Agreements  
The sources of climate change risk—fossil fuel use and land-use changes—are globally 
distributed. Therefore, responsibility for resolving the problem also must ultimately be widely 
shared. This fact is vividly illustrated by calculations of future changes in atmospheric GHGs 
presented by Jacoby et al. (1998). These authors analyze the consequences of having continued 
and strengthened GHG controls within the Annex I industrialized countries, while allowing rapid 
emissions growth in the developing world. The projections indicate that even if the current 
                                                 
47 For further discussion and competing perspectives on these issues, see Geller and Nadel (1994), Metcalf (1994), 
Jaffe and Stavins (1994), Levine et al. (1995), Interlaboratory Working Group (1997) and Newell et al. (1999).  
Another issue that arises in this debate is the prospect of stimulating efficiency-increasing innovation through GHG 
or energy efficiency policies. Economic incentive policies broadly enhance GHG-reducing innovation, as discussed 
above, though there may be countervailing effects from displacing investment in other innovative activities (Goulder 
and Schneider 1999). The same assertion cannot automatically be said of technology or market creation policies, 
which may favor only one narrow range of technology options.  
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developed world drives its net GHG emissions to zero by the end of this century, the impacts on 
the atmosphere would be small.  
But the need for global reduction in GHGs to achieve long-term atmospheric stabilization 
leaves open the distribution of the costs of achieving such a target. The U.N. Framework 
Convention posits “common but differentiated responsibilities” for rich and poor countries in 
responding to the risk of climate change. This is often interpreted as applying to emission control 
responsibilities per se but is equally applicable to the broader issue of cost distribution.  The 
distinction is important because a globally cost-effective GHG emissions control strategy will 
entail emissions constraints (relative to business as usual) in all countries, not just in the 
industrialized world (Jacoby et al. 1998).  In principle, at least, nations can seek to pursue such a 
globally cost-effective solution while dealing with economic distributional issues through 
different forms of international resource transfer.   
The international policy objective is obvious but elusive—to find incentives to motivate 
nations with strong and diverse self-interests to move voluntarily toward a collective goal of 
reduced carbon emissions. In this section we address two elements of the challenge to 
establishing and maintaining effective international agreement. The first topic reflects a general 
dilemma: The more widespread the responsibility, the greater the challenge to maintain a stable 
agreement because nations have more incentive to free-ride on the actions of other nations. This 
challenge is compounded by national differences in income, vulnerability to climate change, and 
capacities to respond. The other topic is the challenge of expanding participation in global 
climate agreements by engaging developing nations in ways acceptable to rich and poor 
countries alike.  Many of these issues are explored further in the chapter by Barrett in this 
volume. 
A. The Paradox of International Agreements  
The problem of achieving effective and lasting agreements can be summarized as 
follows: A self-enforcing agreement is easiest to close either when the stakes are small or, at the 
other extreme, when no other option exists (a clear and present risk).49 One begins with the 
observation that because no global police force exists to enforce an international climate 
agreement, an agreement must be voluntary and self-enforcing; all sovereign parties must not 
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have any incentive to deviate unilaterally from the terms of the agreement. Nations share a 
common interest in responding to the risk of climate change. However, because climate change 
is a global public good—no nation can be prevented from enjoying climate protection, regardless 
of whether or not they participate in a treaty—national governments will have limited incentives 
to reduce GHGs unilaterally. 
International agreement, if it is successfully implemented, overcomes this reluctance. By 
free-riding, however, some nations can be better off remaining outside an agreement. The greater 
the global net benefits of cooperating relative to the benefits any one country could receive by 
acting alone, the stronger the incentive to free-ride. A self-enforcing agreement is most easily 
maintained when the gains from the agreement are small; that is, when the global net benefits 
from agreement are not much different than not having any agreement. This situation would exist 
if only a few parties were responsible for most of the problem, or if the threat is so serious that 
all countries will want to take strong actions unilaterally. In contrast, a self-enforcing agreement 
is hardest to achieve in the gray area in between, as is the case with climate change, where 
aggregate risks may be substantial but individual benefits result disproportionately from the 
actions of others (for more information see Hoel 1992, Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, 1998, 
Barrett 1994, Bac 1996). Barrett (1994) finds that an international agreement will work only if 
the gains from the agreement are modest or if the number of participants is very small (a few 
countries). Unfortunately, these conditions do not bode well for a climate change agreement, at 
least one involving a very large number of countries. 
If the self-enforcing agreement involves just a few big emitters such as the United States 
and the European Union, total emissions still are likely to be greater than globally desired 
because many nations will remain outside the agreement. For their part, many decisionmakers in 
industrialized countries worry about the consequences to their economies by reducing emissions 
when developing countries face no limits. This scenario could adversely affect the competitive 
position of some sectors in the industrialized world, while “leakage” of emissions from 
controlled to uncontrolled countries would limit the environmental effectiveness of a partial 
agreement. Estimates of this “carbon leakage” vary from a few percent to more than one-third of 
the Annex B reductions, depending on model assumptions regarding substitutability of outputs 
from different countries and other factors (Weyant and Hill 1999). 
Developing nations for their part have many pressing immediate needs, like potable water 
and stable food supply, and less financial and technical capacity than rich countries to mitigate or 
adapt to climate change. These countries also expect to increase energy use and GHGs, both in Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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the aggregate and per capita, as they attempt to increase living standards. These nations have 
limited incentives to sign on to an agreement they see as imposing unacceptable costs on them. 
Signatories who have ongoing relationships can try to alleviate climate change free-riding 
by retaliating through other threats like trade sanctions (see, for example, Chen 1997). But the 
force of this linkage and deterrence is blunted in several respects. A nation’s incentive to deviate 
depends on the short-term temptation from cheating relative to the long-term losses from 
punishment. Participating nations must see a gain in actually applying punishment, otherwise 
their threat of retaliation is not credible. Credibility problems arise when, for example, retaliation 
through trade sanctions damages both the enforcer and the free-rider. Moreover, because many 
forms of sanctions exist, nations would need to select a mutually agreeable set of approaches, 
which would most likely be another involved negotiation process (see, for example, Dockner and 
Long 1993). 
If sticks have limited effect, what about carrots? One possibility is to find more efficient 
policies that lower the cost of participation for all countries. In particular, incentive-based 
climate policies can help by reducing the cost of action for all countries. This approach 
underscores the importance of the mechanisms for international emissions trading in the Kyoto 
Protocol. This point is often lost when critics argue that emissions trading will weaken 
international agreement through the “export” of cheating by a seller country (Caplan et al, 1999; 
Carraro and Siniscalco, 1998). 
Beyond finding opportunities for lowering costs to all participants, it is also necessary to 
consider possibilities for resource redistribution through side payments to enhance incentives for 
agreement. This point is especially important in strengthening incentives for participation by 
lower-income developing countries, whose long-term involvement is crucial but whose 
willingness and ability to pay is limited. We turn next to this issue. 
B. Designing Climate Agreements to Draw in Developing Nations 
Equity is a central element of this issue. However, differences in perceptions about what 
constitutes equitable distributions of effort or cost complicate any agreement. Different 
approaches to redistribution also have varying consequences for cost-effectiveness and political 
acceptability. We consider each of these issues in turn. 
There is no generally agreed-upon standard to establish the equity of any particular 
allocation of GHG control responsibility. Simple rules of thumb, such as allocating responsibility 
based on equal per capita rights to emit GHG (advantageous to developing countries) or Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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allocations that are positively correlated to past and current emissions (advantageous to 
developed countries), are unlikely to command broad political support internationally. The same 
case is true of various dynamic “graduation formulas” that seek to gradually increase the control 
burden of developing countries as they progress economically, though these dynamic approaches 
do offer more negotiating flexibility (Cazorla and Toman 2001).   
Nordhaus (1997) tackles the question of burden sharing and efficiency by proposing an 
innovative mechanism for revealing the willingness-to-pay by individual countries to reduce 
climate change. He views the problem as balancing equity with a country’s gain or loss from 
climate change. Although his mechanism is not fully fleshed out, it illustrates an approach for 
seeking broad participation in GHG control with equitable burden-sharing.50  This approach 
suggests that distributional agreements must emerge endogenously within the framework of 
international bargaining, as opposed to arising exogenously from consensus philosophical 
principles (Schelling, 1995).   
Assuming that agreement in principle on the allocation of burden is achieved, a variety 
of mechanisms might be pursued (Rose et al, 1999). Direct side payments through financial or 
low-cost technical assistance can increase the incentive to join the agreement. Emissions 
trading also allows side payments through the international distribution of national emission 
targets. More reluctant countries can be enticed to join with less stringent targets, which allows 
for sales of surplus emissions quotas, and other countries would have more stringent targets for 
achieving the same result with respect to overall emissions.  
Such an allocation was provided to Russia and Ukraine in the Kyoto Protocol. It is 
sometimes termed “headroom”, but it has come to be called “hot air” by critics who fear it would 
slow international progress by undermining overall environmental progress and giving advanced 
industrial countries like the United States a cheap way out of cutting their own emissions. But 
had this cost-reducing option not been part of the Kyoto package, it is unclear whether the 
United States and other countries would have agreed to the Protocol or achieved its goals in 
practice.51  
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Nevertheless, international reallocations of wealth in permit trading give rise to broader 
domestic political debates. Imagine, for instance, the domestic debate if the United States 
administration decided to transfer many billions of dollars annually to Russia for emission 
permits,52 or perhaps China in a subsequent agreement. Critics assert a Catch-22 character to 
international emissions trading: Without trading, mitigation costs are too high to be politically 
acceptable; with trading, the international distribution of these costs is still politically 
unacceptable.  
This dilemma has caused some observers to promote individually administered national 
carbon taxes as the only reasonable option (Cooper 1998). This approach, however, is not 
panacea for distributional concerns. As already noted, there is a problem of allocating rights and 
responsibilities implicit in any international GHG control agreement, including taxes. The 
argument for taxes rests on the willingness of the developing world to implement substantially 
higher energy taxes than they have today. Although some advantages exist for them (for 
example, more reliable revenue than from income taxes), it is unclear that the advantages are so 
compelling in practice. If developing countries are not willing to impose substantially higher 
energy taxes on their own, then persuading them to participate in a coordinated tax regime will 
require international income transfers. As Wiener (1999) argues, this system is likely to be more 
inefficient and more politically problematic than redistribution through market transactions for 
emissions permits. Without such coordination, however, the tax approach becomes an inefficient 
partial agreement like the Kyoto Protocol, with all its attendant problems. 
To conclude this section we return to the previously mentioned approach of graduation 
rules for developing country participation in binding agreements. Under this approach, 
developing countries gradually assume greater responsibility over time, or as their per capita 
incomes rise. Various proposals include staggered participation in emissions stabilization and 
reduction targets, with the possibility of eventually converging to equal per capita emissions 
levels (for illustrative analyses, see Edmonds et al. 1995, Manne and Richels 1997, Rose et al. 
1998).  
The timing and degree of stringency of control for developing countries are parameters 
that would be settled in international negotiation against a backdrop of some long-term goal for 
GHG concentration, which limits the scale of global emissions. Thus the negotiation of evolving 
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obligations for developing countries implies a symmetric set of obligations for developed 
countries given the concentration target. The more headroom the developing countries are given, 
the greater the implied stringency of Annex I control. The negotiation of a graduation 
mechanism thus implies a burden-sharing rule. The rule may be second-best compared with a 
more direct wealth transfer,53 but the indirect nature of the burden sharing may make this 
approach more politically appealing as a medium-term approach then either a negotiated division 
of carbon quotas or a tax-based approach. 
VI.Conclusions 
Climate change poses risks to society. As with other environmental issues—though to a 
greater degree—complex efficiency and equity issues must be addressed. In this paper we have 
reviewed the nature of the problem and examined how economics has or can contribute to 
understanding the problem. 
What Have We Learned? 
More than a decade of research has sought to better understand the interplay between 
climate change and the world's economy.  There are substantial uncertainties in the benefits and 
costs of policy intervention.  Although this is usually the case for environmental protection, the 
problem is compounded by the very long time horizons involved with climate change and the 
uncertain geographic distribution of effects.  In addition, there are irreversibilities, both in the 
climate system and in methods for controlling greenhouse gas emissions.  These irreversibilities 
have modest implications for near term control and more substantial implications for long run 
emission control policies. 
Notwithstanding the uncertainties, assessments of the costs and benefits of greenhouse 
gas control suggest that limited but gradually increasing control is warranted.  The very 
substantial damages necessary to justify immediate significant action have not been identified, at 
least to date.  Regions likely will differ in their vulnerability, with developing countries generally 
more at risk and some areas at risk of catastrophic damages (e.g., low-lying island states).  
Generally, however, adaptation will play a significant role in buffering the impacts of climate 
change, though the effects of adaptation are themselves uncertain.  
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There has been considerable research on the costs of controlling greenhouse gas 
emissions.  The notion that there are many zero- or low-cost options for control is not generally 
borne out in economic research.  Emission control may be affordable but it is not cheap.  There 
are very real costs at the margin. 
The timing of greenhouse gas emission control can have substantial effects on the costs 
of control without sacrificing the goal of limiting long-term climate change.  A more phased-in 
approach to emission reduction can substantially reduce costs of achieving a given level of GHG 
concentration in the atmosphere. 
Economic analysis has strongly underscored the point that incentive-based policies are 
desirable for cost-effective and credible GHG control.  Moreover, since the costs of greenhouse 
gas control and mitigation vary dramatically around the globe, policies that allow flexibility in 
where as well as how emissions are reduced can dramatically lower the costs of achieving 
climate objectives.  
International participation appears to be necessary to effectively address climate issues.  
But significant challenges exist to establishing agreements that are substantial in their aims and 
credible in their implementation, given the differences in economic circumstances and other 
factors that affect national interests in participation. 
 
Research Implications 
Identification and monetization of damages continues to be an area where the current 
state of knowledge is unsatisfactory.  Damage estimates are fundamental to understanding the 
climate problem yet existing knowledge is incomplete.  This will continue to be an important 
area of research. 
It is becoming increasingly clear that the adjustment costs of adapting to a different 
climate are important.  Understanding of the nature of these costs, let along their quantification, 
is poor.  This is a ripe area for further research. 
The significant gulf between economically efficient climate policies and policies which 
result from the political process suggests that more needs to be known about the operational and 
institutional realities of policy mechanisms.  This would include improved understanding of the 
tension between distribution and efficiency, and the nature of institutional frictions and costs that 
arise in real-world applications. Resources for the Future  Kolstad and Toman 
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There has been considerable work on the effect of uncertainty and information on first-
best climate control policies.  Much less is known about the effect of uncertainty on the 
formation of coalitions and reaching agreements on controlling stock externalities.  For example, 
are coalitions and agreements more or less likely to form before uncertainty is resolved?  This 
would appear to be a ripe area for further research. 
One of the major arguments for early action in greenhouse gas control is that it may spur 
innovation, reducing future costs of emission control.  However, economics has been 
unsuccessful in quantifying the effects on innovation of a change in relative prices or regulatory 
stringency.  This is clearly an area of research potential with significant policy implications. 
Although the evidence suggests that there are no $20 bills laying on the sidewalk, the 
question of why apparently feasible energy conservation measures are not being pursued remains 
important.  In particular, empirical work in this area that can bridge the gap between the bottom-
up view of the world and the top-down view will continue to be important. 
Discounting remains a fundamental philosophical question in climate policy, because of 
the long periods of time involved in trading off costs and benefits.  This is not an issue that will 
be resolved quickly, though progress has been made over the last decade.  Remaining issues 
include reconciling long-term efficiency and dynamic consistency considerations with less well-
defined notions of intergenerational altruism. 
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